PROGRESS ENERGY
hazardous_liquid Incident — — March 27, 2010
Incident Information
| Incident Date | March 27, 2010 |
| Operator | PROGRESS ENERGY |
| Commodity | REFINED AND/OR PETROLEUM PRODUCT (NON-HVL) WHICH IS A LIQUID |
| Pipeline Type | hazardous_liquid |
Location
| State | |
| Coordinates | 27.86028, -82.59958 |
Cause
| Cause | INCORRECT OPERATION |
| Subcause | PIPELINE OR EQUIPMENT OVERPRESSURED |
Casualties
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
Costs
| Property Damage | $15,000 |
| Emergency Response | $212,000 |
| Other Costs | $35,000 |
Location Map
Incident Narrative
"DURING SHIFT CHANGE AT APPROXIMATELY 2230 ON MARCH 27, 2010, PIPELINE OPERATORS FOUND AN OIL SPILL AND LEAKING FLANGE AT THE BARTOW ANCLOTE PIPELINE PUMP AND METER STATION. THE PIPELINE WAS NOT OPERATING, AND THE PIPELINE OPERATORS ISOLATED THE LEAK FROM THE OIL STORAGE TANKS. APPROXIMATELY 12,000 GAL ULTIMATELY LEAKED TO A DIKED AREA. LATER, APPROXIMATELY 8,000 GAL OF THIS OIL WAS RECOVERED AND RETURNED TO THE STORAGE TANKS. MITIGATION OF CONTAMINATED SOIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED. NO SURFACE WATERS OR GROUND WATERS WERE AFFECTED BY THE SPILL. THE FAILED GASKET WAS CAREFULLY ACCESSED AND EXAMINED TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF FAILURE. THE GASKET WAS GARLOCK IFG-5500 AND WAS DETERMINED TO BE A PRODUCT SUITABLE FOR THIS APPLICATION. IT HAD NOT BEEN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE FAILED AT LESS THAN 110% OF MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE. MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE IS 960 PSIG. THE FAILED JOINT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY HYDO TESTED ABOVE 1350 PSIG IN 2005. A ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED THAT A SMALL SECTION (APPROXIMATELY 9 FT) OF ABOVE GROUND PIPING WAS ISOLATED BY CLOSED VALVES. THIS UN-INSULATED BLACK PIPE HEATED IN THE SUN CAUSING A PRESSURE RISE THAT RESULTED IN THE GASKET FAILURE. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE THAT ALLOWED THE SECTION OF PIPING TO BE ISOLATED. SINCE THE FAILED GASKET WAS ISOLATED FROM THE FLOW METERS AND PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS THAT FEED THE SCADA AND LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS, THERE WAS NO CONTROL SYSTEM INDICATION OF A LEAK. FOLLOWING THE GASKET FAILURE, TANK HEAD PRESSURE ALLOWED FLOW THROUGH A CHECK VALVE AND OUT THOUGH THE FAILED GASKET. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE: GASKET MATERIAL THAT WAS NOT PER SPECIFICATION, FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE PRIOR MINOR FLANGE LEAKS AND AMBIENT HEATING INCIDENTS AND APPLY THE LESSONS LEARNED, LIGHTING THAT WAS PARTIALLY NON-FUNCTIONAL, AND CHANGES IN PIPELINE OPERATIONS THAT HAVE RESULTED IN EXTENDED PIPELINE SHUTDOWNS. GASKETS HAVE BEEN REPLACED AT 39 LOCATIONS WHERE THE INSTALLED GASKETS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE PER SPECIFICATION. TWO STANDING ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO PROVIDE INTERIM GUIDANCE WHILE IMPROVED PROCEDURES AND TRAINING ARE BEING DEVELOPED. ONE STANDING ORDER REQUIRES MORE FREQUENT PATROLS TO ASSURE THAT THAT ANY POTENTIAL LEAKS WOULD BE DETECTED MORE QUICKLY. A SECOND STANDING ORDER IDENTIFIES VALVE ALIGNMENTS TO AVOID CREATING SECTIONS OF PIPING FROM AMBIENT HEATING AND PRESSURIZATION. THE PIPELINE WAS PLACED BACK INTO SERVICE WHILE CAREFULLY MONITORING THE SYSTEM TO ASSURE THAT THERE WERE NO LEAKS. THIS ""SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT PLUS FINAL REPORT"" IS BEING SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO THE MARCH 4, 2013 8:52 AM EMAIL FROM [email protected] TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR THE REVISED FORM."
About This Pipeline Incident
Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.