EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO

Incident Narrative

ON THE MORNING OF MAY 30 AT APPROXIMATELY 06:09AM, THE EMPCO OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER RECEIVED RATE OF CHANGE (ROC) INDICATIONS OF A POTENTIAL ISSUE ON THE PIPELINE. EMPCO OCC SHUT THE SYSTEM DOWN AND ISOLATED THE AFFECTED SECTION AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE AND FIELD PERSONNEL ALONG WITH AIR PATROL WERE DEPLOYED TO PATROL THE LINE FOR CONFIRMATION. ADDITIONALLY, AND AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, THE OIL SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (OSRO) WAS MOBILIZED TO STAND BY AND ULTIMATELY RESPONDED TO THE INCIDENT. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, EMPCO ALSO NOTIFIED THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (NRC) AT 10:20AM TO NOTIFY OF A SUSPECTED RELEASE OF UNKNOWN LOCATION ON THE BAYTOWN TO IRVING PRODUCTS PIPELINE (BIPL), BAYTOWN TO SATSUMA LINE SEGMENT. EMPCO PERSONNEL CONFIRMED DISCOVERY OF THE RELEASE AT APPROXIMATELY 12:50PM ON MAY 30 AT THE BROCK PARK LOCATION AND STOOD UP A COMMAND POST AT THE LOCATION TO RESPOND TO THE INCIDENT. THE INCIDENT COMMAND STRUCTURE WAS STOOD DOWN ON JUNE 12, 2021. AFTER INVESTIGATION, THE CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE PROGRESSIVE GROUND MOVEMENT OVER TIME ON THE BAYOU BANK, WHICH EXERTED SUFFICIENT STRAIN ON THE PIPELINE LEADING TO CIRCUMFERENTIAL SEPARATION AT THE GIRTH WELD. BASED ON METALLURGICAL ANALYSIS, THE GIRTH WELD WAS ADEQUATE FOR A STABLE BANK BUT LESS THAN ADEQUATE FOR THE EXERTED STRAIN FROM THE GROUND MOVEMENT COUPLED WITH THE HIGHER STRENGTH ADJACENT PIPE JOINTS. PREVENTION OF REOCCURRENCE INCLUDES AMENDMENTS TO THE EMPCO WATER CROSSING PROGRAM MANUAL, ANALYSIS TOOLS, AND TRAINING MATERIALS TO ADDRESS ASSESSMENT CRITERIA, METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS. PART B.12, SELECTED 1' FOR WATER DEPTH (""0"" NOT AN OPTION), HOWEVER THE FAILURE WAS IN THE BANK OF THE BAYOU AND NOT IN THE WATER.