MARATHON PIPE LINE LLC
hazardous_liquid Incident — — January 28, 2025
Incident Information
| Incident Date | January 28, 2025 |
| Operator | MARATHON PIPE LINE LLC |
| Commodity | HVL OR OTHER FLAMMABLE OR TOXIC FLUID WHICH IS A GAS AT AMBI |
| Pipeline Type | hazardous_liquid |
Location
| State | |
| Coordinates | 28.55366, -97.49240 |
Cause
| Cause | EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| Subcause | DEFECTIVE OR LOOSE TUBING OR FITTING |
Casualties
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
Costs
| Property Damage | $300,000 |
| Emergency Response | $196,300 |
| Other Costs | $3,720 |
Location Map
Incident Narrative
"ON JANUARY 28, AT 0350 CST, THE LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTACTED THE PIPELINE OPERATIONS CENTER, REPORTING A VAPOR CLOUD ON BENGL SEGMENT B (ORLA JUNCTION - SWEENY 24""-20"" PRODUCTS) AT BLOCK VALVE 17. LOCAL OPERATIONS CONFIRMED THE RELEASE AT 05:08 CST, AND IT WAS DEEMED TO MEET NRC REPORTABILITY THRESHOLDS AT 06:30 CST BASED ON THE ESTIMATED RESPONSE COST. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A CONNECTION ON THE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TUBING HAD FAILED. THE LINE SEGMENT WAS ISOLATED AND FLARED TO COMPLETE THE REPAIR. THE FLARING PROCESS RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF 257 BARRELS OF LIQUIDS FROM THE PIPE AT 99% EFFICIENCY, RESULTING IN APPROXIMATELY 2.6 BARRELS OF NGL RELEASED INTENTIONALLY. EIGHTEEN HOUSEHOLDS WERE IMPACTED; THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF EVACUEES IS BASED ON THE CENSUS BUREAU DATA FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS, INDICATING 2.7 PEOPLE PER HOUSEHOLD. CPM WAS NOT ACTIVE WHILE FILLING THE LINE WITH NGLS. A PIG WAS INSERTED AT THE RECEIPT STATION, WITH NGLS PUSHED BEHIND IT AND NITROGEN AHEAD. CPM WOULD HAVE REMAINED IN ALARM SINCE THERE WAS ONLY A RECEIPT METER AND NO DELIVERY METER. INSTEAD, LEAK DETECTION WAS MANAGED THROUGH OVER/SHORT MONITORING. PIG TRACKERS PROVIDED LOCATION UPDATES AT ABOVE-GROUND MARKERS, ALLOWING THE CONTROLLER TO COMPARE KNOWN LINE FILL VOLUMES WITH THE RECEIPT METER READINGS. AT THE TIME OF THE RELEASE, WWM OPERATING LLC (OPID - 39572) WAS THE DOT OPERATOR OF RECORD OF BANGL SEGMENT B (ORLA JUNCTION - SWEENY 24""-20"" PRODUCTS). THE OPERATORSHIP OF THE SEGMENT CHANGED TO MPL ON FEBRUARY 7TH, 2025. SUPPLEMENTAL UPDATE: MPL IS UNRETRACTING THE FORM 7000-1 REPORT AT THE REQUEST OF THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS (RRC). MPL CONTINUES TO WORK WITH WWM REGARDING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPORTING THE RELEASE BASED ON THE DATE OF CHANGE IN OPERATORSHIP, WHICH OCCURRED ON FEBRUARY 7, 2025. MPL CHANGED THE METHOD OF FAILURE TO ""MANUFACTURING DEFECT"" TO ALIGN WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE RRC INVESTIGATION REPORT: ""THE ANALYSIS OF THE EQUIPMENT FAILURE WAS DUE TO A CORROSION INTERFERENCE COUPLER CONNECTION THAT FAILED DURING THE PRODUCT FILL. THE OPERATOR'S MITIGATION OF REOCCURRENCE WAS TO HAVE THE CORROSION INTERFERENCE COUPLER RELOCATED UPSTREAM OF THE 3/4-INCH STAINLESS TUBING TO THE 2-INCH BALL VALVE. THE REMOVAL OF THE COUPLER REDUCED THE STAINLESS STEEL TUBING CONNECTIONS FROM FOUR DOWN TO TWO, REDUCING THE POTENTIAL POINTS OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE. THE OPERATOR APPLIED THIS TO ALL ABOVE GROUND STATIONS THAT HAD THE SAME INSTRUMENTATION TUBING."""
About This Pipeline Incident
Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.