CAPTUREPOINT LLC

hazardous_liquid Incident — — May 28, 2025

Incident Information

Incident DateMay 28, 2025
OperatorCAPTUREPOINT LLC
CommodityCO2 (CARBON DIOXIDE)
Pipeline Typehazardous_liquid

Location

State
Coordinates36.17517, -101.04497

Cause

CauseMATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
Subcause"DESIGN-, CONSTRUCTION-, INSTALLATION-, OR FABRICATION-RELATED"

Casualties

Fatalities0
Injuries0

Costs

Property Damage$18,000
Emergency Response$1,000
Other Costs$1,000

Location Map

Incident Narrative

"ON 5/29/25, 1300 CDT, A LOCAL LANDOWNER VISITED THE CAPTUREPOINT OFFICE IN PERRYTON TEXAS AND INFORMED JASON PELTON, A CAPTUREPOINT EMPLOYEE, OF A POSSIBLE CO2 LEAK ON HIS LAND. HE TOLD JASON THAT HE CALLED THE EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBER ON THE LINE MARKERS AND VALVE RISERS THE DAY BEFORE ON 5/28/25, 1500 CDT. CAPTUREPOINT EMPLOYEE AUSTEN PITTS WAS INFORMED SHORTLY AFTER JASON AND PROCEEDED TO LOCATION. THE PIPELINE FAILURE WAS CONFIRMED BY AUSTEN PITTS ON 5/29/25, 15:00 CDT. AUSTEN CONTACTED THE LANDOWNER AND DISCUSSED THE PLAN TO SHUT-IN MLV1 AND MLV2 TO BLOWDOWN THE PIPELINE AND ISOLATE THE FAILURE. NO EVACUATIONS, ROAD CLOSURES, INJURIES, FATALITIES OR PUBLIC NOTIFICATIONS WERE NECESSARY. MLV1 AND MLV2 WERE CLOSED 5/29/25, 1630 CDT AND AUSTEN PITTS AND DREW PRICE PATROLLED AND MONITORED THE PIPELINE BLOWDOWN UNTIL 5/29/25, 1815 CDT. KIRK LOVE WITH CAPTUREPOINT CONTACTED THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (NRC) AND INFORMED THEM OF THE LINE FAILURE ON 5/29/25, 15:55 CDT. HE WAS GIVEN NRC REPORT #1432544. THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION WAS ALSO INFORMED OF THE POSSIBLE PIPELINE LEAK. AFTER THE PIPELINE WAS BLOWN DOWN AND THE FAILURE POINT ISOLATED, OQ QUALIFIED CONTRACTORS WERE CONTACTED TO BEGIN INVESTIGATING AND REPAIRING THE PIPELINE. METALLURGICAL ENGINEERING SERVICES, INC. (MES), PERFORMED A FAILURE ANALYSIS WHICH STATED: ""BASED ON THE FAILURE ANALYSIS CONDUCTED ON THE SUBJECT 6-INCH NOMINAL PIPE, THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE FAILURE WAS IDENTIFIED AS WELD DEFECTS WITHIN THE CIRCUMFERENTIAL GIRTH WELD HEAT AFFECTED ZONE (HAZ), AS A RESULT OF POOR WORKMANSHIP. THE PRIMARY FAILURE WAS LOCATED AT THE 12 O'CLOCK POSITION, ADJACENT TO THE DOWNSTREAM SIDE OF THE WELD CAP. POOR WELD ALIGNMENT AND HIGH WELD AMPERAGE RESULTED IN INADEQUATE FUSION BETWEEN THE BASE AND WELD METALS, WHICH CREATED A COLD JOINT WITH INSUFFICIENT METAL FUSION AT THIS LOCATION."" IN SUMMARY, MES DETERMINED ""...THE PRIMARY ROOT CAUSE OF THE FAILURE WAS IDENTIFIED AS WELD DEFECTS WITHIN THE GIRTH WELD HAZ, SPECIFICALLY POOR WELD ALIGNMENT AND INADEQUATE FUSION. THESE DEFECTS LED TO PREFERENTIAL CORROSION ATTACK, EXACERBATED BY THE PRESENCE OF CHALCOGENS, RESULTING IN THE THROUGH HOLE FAILURE. ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED INCOMPLETE FUSION, CRATERING, AND SLAG INCLUSIONS WITHIN THE WELD AREA. ALL RELEVANT TEST OUTCOMES SUPPORT THESE FINDINGS, CONFIRMING THAT THE FAILURE ORIGINATED FROM WELD-RELATED ISSUES RATHER THAN BASE METAL COMPOSITION OR MECHANICAL PROPERTIES."""

About This Pipeline Incident

Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.

Back to All Incidents More Incidents in