CONSUMERS ENERGY CO

gas_transmission Incident — — September 15, 2016

Incident Information

Incident DateSeptember 15, 2016
OperatorCONSUMERS ENERGY CO
CommodityNATURAL GAS
Pipeline Typegas_transmission

Location

State
Coordinates42.20690, -83.96910

Cause

CauseINCORRECT OPERATION
Subcause"VALVE LEFT OR PLACED IN WRONG POSITION, BUT NOT RESULTING IN AN OVERPRESSURE"

Casualties

Fatalities0
Injuries0

Costs

Property Damage$0
Emergency Response$0
Other Costs$0

Location Map

Incident Narrative

"AT 0816 HOURS ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2016, TWO EMPLOYEES WERE FOLLOWING A PROCEDURE TO REPLACE A SECTION OF PIPE AT FIREGATE BOX 2-4 AT FREEDOM COMPRESSOR STATION. TO ISOLATE THE LINE TO BE WORKED ON, THE PILOT GAS LINES BETWEEN THE PILOT ISOLATION VALVE AND PILOT GAS SOLENOID WERE REQUIRED TO BE VENTED. IN ORDER TO PERFORM THIS TASK, THE FIREGATE VENT VALVES NEEDED TO BE IMMOBILIZED, TO PREVENT THE UNINTENDED RELEASE OF GAS. THE NORMAL PROCEDURE TO COMPLETE THIS TASK IS TO ISOLATE THE LOCAL POWER GAS AT THE ACTUATOR, AND VENT THE LINE BETWEEN THE ISOLATION VALVE AND THE ACTUATOR, THEN ISOLATE THE PILOT GAS AT THE ACTUATOR, AND VENT THE LINE BETWEEN THE ISOLATION VALVE AND THE ACTUATOR. ALL POWER GAS LINES AND PILOT GAS LINES TO THE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVE ACTUATORS WERE ISOLATED, AND THE CREW BEGAN TO VENT THE PILOT LINES ON TWO OF THE VALVES, VALVE 612 AND VALVE 614. THIS RESULTED (AS DESIGNED) IN TWO FIREGATE VALVES (612 AND 614) TRAVELING TO 100% OPEN AND VENTING 3.484 MMCF OF NATURAL GAS FROM A 620 PSI LINE TO ATMOSPHERE THROUGH THE 16-FOOT VENT STACK, FROM 0816 HOURS TO 0825 HOURS. THE OPENED VALVES WERE MANUALLY CLOSED BY STATION PERSONNEL. AFTER RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCEDURE AND SITUATION, STATION PERSONNEL RELIEVED PRESSURE OFF OF THE POWER GAS BETWEEN THE ISOLATION VALVE AND FIREGATE VENT VALVE ACTUATORS, AND THEN RELIEVED PRESSURE OFF THE PILOT GAS. THE REQUIRED SEQUENCE TO ISOLATE FIREGATE VALVES IS TO ISOLATE POWER GAS AND THEN PILOT GAS. THIS SEQUENCE WAS NOT OUTLINED IN THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED. A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE PROCEDURE WAS NOT COMPLETED BY ADDITIONAL ENGINEERING REPRESENTATION FROM GAS COMPRESSION OPERATIONS, AND A PHYSICAL WALK-DOWN OF THE EQUIPMENT WAS NOT PERFORMED BY THE SITE FIELD LEADER, PRINCIPAL FIELD LEADER, OR BY ASSIGNED CREW PRIOR TO PROCEDURE APPROVAL OR WORK PERFORMANCE."

About This Pipeline Incident

Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.

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