Uvify IFO

Full Narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn December 21, 2024, about 1835 eastern standard time (EST), multiple sUA, experienced a loss of control and rapid descent while performing at a sUA light show at Lake Eola, Orlando, Florida. The swarm of sUA, Uvify IFO, were operated by Sky Elements LLC, doing business as (dba) Sky Elements Drone Shows. A minor child was impacted in the face and chest by a sUA and was seriously injured. A postaccident inspection revealed that numerous sUA impacted the ground and sustained substantial damage. The sUA light show was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 107 and a Certificate of Waiver and Authorization issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The RPIC reported that the light show consisted of 500 sUA launched from a small peninsula in the northeast corner of Lake Eola. Setup for the day was standard and consisted of preflight checks, ensuring that the software programming matched and was updated on all show computers, and the layout of the 500-drone grid on the ground, see figure 1.

Figure 1. sUA setup at Lake Eola. (Source: Sky Elements LLC)
Initially, about 5 aircraft were not accepting the launch data. Standard troubleshooting of the Wi-Fi access points was implemented, and all 500 aircraft were located on the network about 5 minutes before showtime. A soft reboot of the entire fleet was conducted to bring all aircraft to “show ready” mode. After the reboot, all systems showed green except for the systems on two aircraft; which the RPIC reported were removed from the show.
The operational aircraft were armed and the countdown sequence initiated. At liftoff it was noted that the aircraft “layers” did not lift uniformly. Further investigation revealed that the path parameter file that contained the final flight paths had not been sent, and that the show center was not completely aligned.
A review of the DSS revealed that the show center position uploaded to the drones was incorrect which resulted in a deviation of about 5 meters or 16.4 feet. When the show center position is inaccurate the software will map incorrect drones to flight paths. This can be seen via the 3D view page of DSS (see figure 2).

Figure 2. The image on the left illustrates the sUA accident light show. Note the show is repositioned and has numerous crossing paths. The right image illustrates a correct orientation with no crossing paths. (Source: Sky Elements LLC)
Furthermore, when the show center location was updated only 498 drones were selected rather than 500, which resulted in 2 drones with a different show center positions than the others. Although configuration errors existed, software records confirmed that all 500 drones launched at the commencement of the show, even though the RPIC reported he had removed two.
The show heading was entered incorrectly and was rotated by about 7°.
Witness video confirmed that the sUA did not liftoff in uniform layers and as they illuminated and moved to their first frame of animation, they shifted position and altitude which resulted in a collision with other aircraft and a loss of control. After the collisions occurred numerous aircraft could be seen falling from the sky and impacting the ground. One aircraft could be seen streaking towards the audience.
Each sUA contained a micro secure digital (microSD) card that recorded data. Of the effected aircraft, about 42 were recovered by the operator and their microSD cards were sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis. The accident aircraft was recovered by law enforcement personnel and sent to the NTSB. Five aircraft are believed to have impacted the lake and were not recovered.
The microSD card for the accident sUA (drone) revealed that the drone took off at 18:34:26 and ascended to about 138 ft GPS altitude where it paused for about 9 seconds. At 18:34.49.8, the event log indicated a falling impact was detected and the drone began descending. The drone started flying to the southwest at about 18:34:51. At about 18:34:53, the drone turned toward the south. At 18:34:55, the drone turned toward the southwest while descending.
At 18:34:57.1, the event log indicated that the drone was approaching the soft geofence and that the hard geofence was violated 0.1 second later. The event log indicated another falling impact was detected at 18:34:57.7. The last position was recorded at 18:34:57.9. The drone reached a top speed at the point it violated the hard geofence of 29.9 meters per second (m/s), or 58.1 knots (kts), and the last recorded speed was 22.2 m/s (43.2 kts). See figure 3 for an overview of the accident drone flight path.

Figure 3. Overview of accident drone flight path in yellow (times EST). Soft geofence is shown in white outline.
The DSS had options to adjust the geofences around the drone show. The software was equipped with two geofences, a soft geofence and a hard geofence. The soft geofence is the first line of defense and when reached sends a sUA back to its home point to land. The hard geofence is programmed to disarm the sUA’s motors immediately upon reaching the geofence.
The misalignment of the show heading resulted in the show flight position being off by about 18 meters or 59 ft, which moved the show and geo hard fence closer to the audience. The policy for margin between the two geofences had changed from 5 meters (about 16.4 ft) to 1 meter (3.28 ft )12 days before the accident. According to the operator, it was the responsibility of the RPIC to update the command laptops with the new margin default setting as they were being used for shows. The data revealed that the geofence margin had not been updated and was set to 5 meters (16.4 ft).
After the loss of control event, the RPIC reported that he closely monitored the remaining aircraft through visual observation and telemetry readings from the ground control station. He determined that, due to the steps involved in pausing the show, recovering airborne sUA and the designated flight paths, that the safest course of action for the audience and sUA was to let the show proceed. The remaining aircraft completed the show and landed without further incident. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe RPIC received a remote pilot certificate with a small unmanned aircraft systems rating on August 30, 2016. He reported 15 to 20 years of experience with unmanned aircraft systems, including 10 to 15 years in commercial operations. He had about three years of experience conducting drone shows, about one year with a prior company and two years with Sky Elements. He estimated that he had participated in about 300 drone shows before the accident. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe Uvify IFO is a small swarm light show drone, with four propellers about 10.8 inches in length x 10.8 inches in width x 4.9 inches in height weighing about 1.4 pounds without the battery, see figure 4. According to the UVify IFO user guide, the battery would add an additional 415 grams, or about 0.9 pounds, and that the maximum reference speed of the IFO is 60 kilometers per hour, or about 32 knots. The Uvify IFO system relies on programming and precise spatial alignment for deconfliction and is not equipped with collision avoidance technologies.

Figure 4. UVify IFO accident drone. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe Uvify IFO is a small swarm light show drone, with four propellers about 10.8 inches in length x 10.8 inches in width x 4.9 inches in height weighing about 1.4 pounds without the battery, see figure 4. According to the UVify IFO user guide, the battery would add an additional 415 grams, or about 0.9 pounds, and that the maximum reference speed of the IFO is 60 kilometers per hour, or about 32 knots. The Uvify IFO system relies on programming and precise spatial alignment for deconfliction and is not equipped with collision avoidance technologies.

Figure 4. UVify IFO accident drone. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCertificate of Waiver
At the time of the accident the FAA had issued a Certificate of Waiver and Authorization to Sky Elements LLC which allowed 1 RPIC to operate multiple drones at a time. The waiver listed the general counsel/chief pilot as the responsible party and stated in part:
Common Special Provisions. The Responsible Person is directly responsible for safety of operations conducted under this Waiver and will ensure the Remote Pilot in Command (remote PIC), manipulator of the controls, and visual observer(s) (VO)1 comply with all provisions of this Waiver.
1. The Responsible Person listed on the Waiver is responsible to the FAA for the safe conduct of the operations. Prior to conducting operations that are the subject of this Waiver, the Responsible Person:
a. Must ensure the remote PIC, manipulators of the controls, and VO(s) are informed of the terms and provisions of this Waiver and strictly observe the terms and provisions herein;
b. Must ensure the remote PIC, manipulators of the controls, and VO(s) are informed and familiar with part 107 regulations; and
c. Evidence of the above (a and b) must be documented and must be presented for inspection upon request from the Administrator or an authorized representative



Safety Actions
Since the accident, Sky Elements has implemented the following mitigations to prevent recurrence:
o Require a minimum of two Part 107 certificate holders, designated as pilot and co-pilot, with defined roles and responsibilities.
o Retrain all pilots on existing and newly implemented procedures.
o Implement a paper checklist to be completed and signed by both pilots.
o Strengthen requirements for the use of screen-recording devices.
o Allow additional on-site setup time to reduce operational pressure.
o Establish a “15-minute show-ready” rule, requiring all procedures be completed at least 15 minutes prior to show start; otherwise, the show is delayed by 15 minutes.
o Recall all show computers to verify proper parameter settings and require parameter checks prior to each show.
o Enhance procedures to ensure correct show heading entry before each event.
o Maintain a minimum safety buffer of 155 feet between the geofence boundary and spectators.
o Software enhancements that provided additional safety protections by preventing RPIC’s from modifying critical flight parameters, embedding show coordinates directly within the show file, and restricting access to those coordinates. Additional safeguards included the implementation of a third, path-based geofence and an Extended Kalman Filter failsafe that automatically disarms the sUA when activated. TESTS AND RESEARCHFollowing the accident, operational testing of the command laptops, wireless access points and Real Time Kinematics (RTK) system revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATIONSky Elements LLC was founded in 2021 and is headquarter in Coppell, Texas. The company is commonly known as Sky Elements Drone Shows and is a professional drone light show company. The management consists of the CEO, Chief Pilot/General Counsel, Director of Operations/Chief Compliance Officer and Creative Director. Operational management functions consist of logistics and fleet management, airspace and regulatory compliance, and animation and design production.
At the time of the accident, the company did not have a policy or procedure in place for management or another remote pilot to verify that the RPIC had set the appropriate show parameters before initiating a drone light show.