AMS FLIGHT D O O CARAT A
Centralhatchee, GA, November 20, 2024
Event Information
| Date | November 20, 2024 |
| Event Type | ACC |
| Location | Centralhatchee, GA |
| Country | USA |
| Coordinates | 33.35812, -85.11914 |
| Airport | Sunset Strip Airport |
| Highest Injury | SERS |
| NTSB Number | ERA25LA064 |
| Event ID | 20241204199379 |
Aircraft
| Make | AMS FLIGHT D O O |
| Model | CARAT A |
| Registration # | N17GF |
| Owner | T2 AEROSPACE INC |
| Category | GLI |
| FAR Part | 091 |
| Aircraft Damage | SUBS |
Conditions
| Light Condition | DAYL |
| Weather | VMC |
Injuries
| Fatal | 0 |
| Serious | 1 |
| Minor | 0 |
| None | 0 |
| Total Injured | 1 |
Event Location
Probable Cause
Maintenance personnel’s failure to comply with the engine manufacturer’s guidance, which resulted in improper valvetrain clearances, unseating of the intake valve keepers, and a total loss of engine power.
Full Narrative
On November 20, 2024, about 1330 eastern standard time, an AMS Flight D O O Carat A motor glider, N17GF, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Sunset Strip Airport (7GE5), Centralhatchee, Georgia. The pilot sustained serious injuries. The motor glider was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot reported that the motor glider departed with 13 gallons of fuel from Thomas Ridge Airport (3GA7), Rupert, Georgia, and was destined for Northeast Alabama Regional Airport (KGAD), Gadsden, Alabama. About 1 hour after departure, the pilot described that the engine experienced a partial loss of engine power and began to run rough. Shortly thereafter, the engine lost power completely. The pilot’s attempt to restore power was unsuccessful. He selected the nearest airport in his GPS database and performed a forced landing to Sunset Strip (7GE5), Centralhatchee, Georgia. As he approached the runway, he observed cattle and a fence on the turf runway. During the landing, the motor glider landed hard and came to rest inverted.
A Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the motor glider at the accident site, and observed that the motor glider’s engine was impact-separated and the airframe exhibited fractures in several areas.
A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 4 cylinder intake valve had separated from its two keepers/safety wedges and had fractured into three sections. The valve face was found inside the cylinder, and the valve stem was deformed and observed in the intake manifold. Impact damage was noted to the interior of the cylinder bore, piston and head. One valve keeper was located in the valve cover and exhibited abrasion at its rotocap contact surface; the other keeper was not located. The intake rocker arm adjustment screw was backed off, and the corresponding jamb nut was separated and found in the valve cover. The exhaust rocker arm jamb nut for the No. 4 cylinder remained in place, but its adjustment screw was backed off. These settings differed from those observed on the remaining three cylinders. Abrasion was noted on both the intake and exhaust rocker arm adjustment areas, consistent with contact between the rocker arms and the rotocaps during engine operation.
Maintenance records showed the motor glider’s most recent condition inspection was completed on May 20, 2024, at a tachometer time of 114.0 hours and a total airframe time of 259.6 Hobbs hours. The intake and exhaust valves were last replaced on May 18, 2017, at a tachometer time of 45.2 hours. At the time of the accident, the airframe Hobbs time was 314.5 hours, and the tachometer time was 152.3 hours. Thus, the motor glider had accrued 54.9 hours since its last condition inspection, and the engine had accrued 107.1 tachometer hours since replacement of the valves.
Sauer Aircraft Engine’s maintenance publications, Technical Note Nos. 25 & 26, dated December 14, 2016, specified that the clearance between the rocker arm and rotocap must be at least 1 millimeter (mm) when the valve was fully depressed, and that this clearance must be visually inspected at intervals not exceeding 100 hours. The publications stated that rocker arm contact with the rotocap may allow unseating of the valve keepers/safety wedges and result in a loss of engine power.
At the time of the accident, 7GE5 was charted as a private use airport requiring permission prior to landing. The single turf runway was oriented in a 04/22 configuration and was 2,300 ft-long and 75 ft-wide. The airport’s activation was dated February 2005. The FAA Office of Airports reported that although the property owner submitted an FAA Form 7480-1 and received a determination letter, the local municipality did not approve the airport. Because the owner did not return a signed FAA Form 5010-1, the airport should not have been activated or charted in an aviation database for an available airport. At the owner’s request, the FAA submitted a subsequent Form 7480-1 to deactivate the airport; the deactivation became effective March 10, 2025, 110 days after the accident.
About This NTSB Record
This aviation event was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). NTSB investigates all U.S. civil aviation accidents to determine probable cause and issue safety recommendations to prevent future accidents.