PIPER PA28

Full Narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 14, 2024, at 1248 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-140 airplane, N515DH, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Siler City, North Carolina. The flight instructor and student pilot were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Executive Flight Training and Services LLC as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.
Another flight instructor for the same operator was flying a second airplane in the traffic pattern at Siler City Municipal Airport (SCR) at the time of the accident. Both the flight instructor and his student provided written statements, and their versions of events were consistent throughout.
The accident airplane entered the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 22 as the flight instructor and his student climbed on the upwind leg after performing a touch-and-go landing. The flight instructor in the second airplane said he adjusted his subsequent traffic pattern for “spacing” and that his airplane was about midfield on the downwind leg when he watched the accident airplane in a touch-and-go landing.
The flight instructor in the second airplane stated that, as his airplane approached the left base leg of the traffic pattern, the accident flight crew asked for his airplane’s position over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and then requested, “Can you extend, we’re having an issue?” The student pilot’s recollection of the transmission was, “We are having issues, can we land?”
Both the flight instructor and the student pilot said there were no further transmissions from the accident airplane. They heard “hot mic[rophone]” and “background” noises over the radio but no discernible voices or other sounds, including a stall horn. According to the student pilot, 30 to 45 seconds elapsed between the request for a position report and the background noises from the accident airplane.

The flight instructor of the second airplane stated that he watched the accident airplane’s altitude readout on his ADS-B display “get lower and lower.” When he banked his airplane for a “more clear view,” he and his student saw smoke rising from the trees near the accident site.
A witness who was baling hay in the grassy area near the runway stated that he saw the accident airplane take off. He reported that the airplane “looked different,” describing it as “flying sideways.” As it climbed east of the runway, the airplane “almost rolled over on its side and went into a nosedive” before impacting the ground. The witness then observed rising black smoke.
ADS-B track data from the FAA showed that the accident airplane departed Raleigh Executive Jetport at Sanford-Lee County Airport (TTA), Sanford, North Carolina, about 1229 and entered the SCR traffic pattern about 1246. The data depicted the accident airplane on the downwind leg at about 1,100 ft mean sea level (msl) and a ground speed of about 90 kts. The airplane turned and slowed on the left base leg to the low 80-kt range and then entered the final approach leg, slowing to the low 70-kt range before the ADS-B track data was lost.
About 1 minute later, the track data resumed near the runway’s departure end at 625 ft msl and a ground speed of 66 kts. Over the next 25 seconds, the airplane turned about 90° to the left. The final two targets showed altitudes of 700 ft and 800 ft msl and ground speeds of 65 kts and 71 kts, respectively, before the track data ended. (See figure.) The airport elevation at SCR is 615 ft msl.

Figure: ADS-B Flight Track Data. Times are shown in coordinated universal time (UTC). PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine. His FAA first-class medical certificate was issued May 13, 2022, without limitations. The flight instructor did not report any medications or medical concerns to the aviation medical examiner.
The operator’s chief managing director reported that the accident flight instructor received his flight instructor rating on November 14, 2023, and that the operator hired him as a flight instructor that same month. The chief managing director reported that the instructor’s logbooks were incomplete. He used the available pilot logbook and company records to estimate that the flight instructor had accrued 682 hours of total flight experience. He accrued a total of 297 hours in the accident airplane make and model, of which 246.8 hours were accrued while providing flight instruction. The operator did not provide any additional flight records.
The student pilot was issued an FAA first-class medical certificate on December 18, 2023. The operator reported that the student pilot had accrued about 25 total hours of flight experience. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to the Piper PA-28-140 pilot’s operating handbook (POH), with the flaps retracted, the stall speeds at bank angles of 45°, 50°, and 60° were 76 mph (66 kts), 80 mph (69 kts), and 92 mph (80 kts), respectively. The POH further stated that, in the event of a loss of engine power during takeoff, the pilot should land straight ahead if sufficient runway remains for a normal landing. If insufficient runway remains, the POH instructs the pilot to maintain a safe airspeed and make only a shallow turn, if necessary, to avoid obstructions. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe recorded temperature and dew point near the accident site were about 84.2°F and 68°F, respectively. According to a carburetor-icing probability chart, the temperature and dew point corresponded to the “serious icing – glide power” range. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to the Piper PA-28-140 pilot’s operating handbook (POH), with the flaps retracted, the stall speeds at bank angles of 45°, 50°, and 60° were 76 mph (66 kts), 80 mph (69 kts), and 92 mph (80 kts), respectively. The POH further stated that, in the event of a loss of engine power during takeoff, the pilot should land straight ahead if sufficient runway remains for a normal landing. If insufficient runway remains, the POH instructs the pilot to maintain a safe airspeed and make only a shallow turn, if necessary, to avoid obstructions. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe accident site was located in wooded terrain about 2,260 ft southeast of the departure end of runway 22. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane came to rest in its initial impact crater at an elevation of 562 ft, oriented on a magnetic heading of 330°, and was mostly consumed by a postimpact fire that extended to the empennage. The leading edges of both wings displayed uniform crushing across their entire spans. The engine was exposed, and the attached propeller was buried in the impact crater. The engine accessories were destroyed by fire.
The engine controls and the majority of the instrument panel were destroyed. The recording tachometer was thermally damaged, with its indicator needle static at about 2,300 rpm. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the respective flight control surfaces. The flap lever exhibited impact and thermal damage, and the flaps were observed in the retracted position. The stabilator trim jackscrew was extended above the drum with approximately five threads exposed, which corresponded to a neutral trim setting.
The fuel primer plunger was stowed and locked. Both fuel tanks were destroyed by impact and thermal damage. The fuel strainer bowl was covered in soot, and the surrounding structure was impact-damaged. No liquid was observed in the strainer bowl, and the fuel strainer screen was free of blockage. The electric fuel pump was thermally damaged and could not be tested. The fuel selector handle was consumed by fire. The fuel selector valve was impact- and thermally damaged, which allowed the valve shaft to rotate freely in the valve housing. The positions of the fuel selector valve and handle at the time of impact could not be determined.
Examination of the engine revealed that the rear-mounted accessories were destroyed by fire. The carburetor was thermally damaged and partially separated from the engine. The induction alternate air box was crushed, and its position could not be determined because of thermal and impact damage. The intake tubes, exhaust tubes, and the exhaust muffler were partially crushed. The crankshaft flange was bent, and the starter ring gear support was fragmented. The propeller spinner was impact crushed.
The engine was suspended from a lift and partially disassembled to facilitate examination. The exhaust tubes were cut and the muffler removed. The propeller and starter ring gear support were removed, and the bent portion of the crankshaft flange was cut away to allow the crankshaft to be rotated through 360°. The engine crankshaft was rotated using a tool inserted in the engine accessory case vacuum pump drive pad. Continuity of the crankshaft to the rear gears and to the valvetrain components was confirmed. Compression and suction were attained from all four cylinders. Borescope examination of the cylinder interiors revealed no anomalies.
The propeller was attached to the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited longitudinal twisting, chordwise abrasions, and varying degrees of aft deformation. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONFAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (CE-09-35) – “Carburetor Icing Prevention,” states that:
“…pilots should be aware that carburetor icing doesn't just occur in freezing conditions, it can occur at temperatures well above freezing temperatures when there is visible moisture or high humidity. Icing can occur in the carburetor at temperatures above freezing because vaporization of fuel, combined with the expansion of air as it flows through the carburetor, (Venturi Effect) causes sudden cooling, sometimes by a significant amount within a fraction of a second. Carburetor ice can be detected by a drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes and a drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes. In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation.”
According to FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-35 (Carburetor Icing Prevention), pilots should be aware that carburetor icing doesn’t just occur in freezing conditions: it can occur at temperatures well above freezing temperatures when there is visible moisture or high humidity. Icing can occur in the carburetor at temperatures above freezing because vaporization of fuel, combined with the expansion of air as it flows through the carburetor (Venturi effect), causes sudden cooling, sometimes by a significant amount within a fraction of a second. Carburetor ice can be detected by a drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes and a drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes. In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation.
The bulletin goes on to say, in part, that there are some steps a pilot can take to prevent, recognize, and respond to carburetor icing.
To prevent carburetor icing, the pilot should:
o Assure the proper functionality of the carburetor heat during the ground (Before Takeoff) check.
o Use carburetor heat on approach and descent when operating at low power settings, or in conditions where carburetor icing is probable.
To recognize carburetor icing, the warning signs are:
o A drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes.
o A drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes.
o In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation.
The pilot should respond to carburetor icing by applying full carburetor heat immediately. The engine may run rough initially for short time while ice melts.
The above recommendations are general suggestions. The pilot should consult the airplane flight manual or the pilot's operating handbook for the proper use of carburetor heat. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONStudent Pilot
The North Carolina Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed the student pilot’s autopsy and listed his cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries, and manner of death was accident. The postmortem toxicological testing of specimens from the student pilot by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory did not detect any drugs, ethanol, or carboxyhemoglobin.
Flight Instructor
The North Carolina Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed the flight instructor’s autopsy and listed the cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries and manner of death as accident.
The postmortem toxicological testing of specimens from the flight instructor by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (delta-9-THC) at 3.2 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 3.6 ng/g in liver tissue. 11-hydroxy-tetrahydrocannabinol (11-hydroxy-THC) was detected at 6 ng/g in liver tissue and was not detected in cavity blood. Carboxy-delta-9-THC was detected at 31 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 855.2 ng/g in liver tissue. Morphine was detected at 2 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 6 ng/g in liver tissue.
Delta-9-THC is the primary psychoactive chemical in cannabis, including marijuana, hashish, and cannabis edibles. Delta-9-THC may be inhaled or ingested recreationally by users seeking mind-altering effects. It may also be used medicinally, such as to treat illness-associated nausea and appetite loss. Psychoactive effects of delta-9-THC vary depending on the user, dose, and route of administration, and may impair motor coordination, reaction time, decision-making, problem solving, and vigilance. The instantaneous level of delta-9-THC in a living person’s blood does not directly predict impairing effects. Interpretation of postmortem levels of delta-9-THC is further complicated by the fact that such levels may differ from antemortem levels. Published FAA guidance indicates that marijuana use by pilots is unacceptable, regardless of state medical and recreational marijuana laws. 11-hydroxy-THC is a psychoactive metabolite of delta-9-THC that undergoes further metabolism to the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-9-THC.
Morphine is an opioid drug that may be used to treat pain. The drug’s adverse effects may include diminished cognitive and psychomotor function. Morphine medication often carries a warning that the drug may impair the mental or physical abilities needed to perform potentially hazardous activities such as driving a car or operating machinery, and that users should be warned not to drive or operate dangerous machinery unless they are tolerant to the effects of the drug and know how they will react to it. The FAA instructs aviation medical examiners not to issue medical certificates to pilots who use opioid medications regularly, although medical certificates may be issued in cases of occasional opioid use for time-limited conditions that are nonrecurrent or recurrent and resolved (and not otherwise disqualifying). Regardless, the FAA states that a pilot should not fly after using an opioid medication until adequate time has elapsed for the drug to be eliminated from circulation. Therapeutic levels of morphine medication in the blood of living people typically range from about 10-100 ng/mL; however, comparing morphine levels in postmortem cavity blood and tissue specimens to reference ranges in living people is unreliable. In addition to being used as a medication or illicitly, morphine may result from metabolism of other drugs, including heroin, an illicit opioid, and codeine, a medication that may be used to treat pain, cough, or diarrhea. Neither drug was detected in this case.
The instructor’s autopsy report did not note any evidence of postaccident medical intervention. The potential combined effects of cannabis and morphine could not be predicted.