BRALLIER SCOTT GLASAIR I

Full Narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 25, 2024, about 2155 eastern daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Glasair 1 airplane, N446KW, was destroyed when it descended into the Gulf of Mexico about 10 nautical miles east-northeast of Alligator Point, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Flight track data and air traffic control (ATC) audio information revealed that the pilot departed Destin Executive Airport (DTS), Destin, Florida, about 2101, with an intended destination of Zephyrhills, Florida. After takeoff, the airplane proceeded east-southeast while receiving visual flight rules flight following services.

As the airplane proceeded over the Gulf of Mexico, it completed multiple slight heading and altitude changes. Between 2148:57 and 2149:18, when the airplane was about 5 nautical miles past the shoreline, it flew on an east-northeasterly heading at an altitude about 6,700 ft, after which it began turning to the right. At 2149:23, while flying on an east-southeasterly heading, the pilot was issued an air traffic control frequency change, which he correctly read back. The airplane continued the right turn to a south-southeasterly direction before entering a left turn. The airplane continued turning left, and at 2154:09, the pilot broadcast a mayday call on the frequency he had been instructed to change to and advised the controller that the flight was going down in Apalachee Bay. One final communication from the pilot occurred at 2154:38, immediately before water impact. That communication, which was heard by another pilot, indicated that the airplane was about to contact the water. Figure 1 shows the final portion of the airplane’s flight track.


Figure 1. The airplane’s flight track during the final portion of the flight.
About 2156, the controller asked the pilot who had heard the accident pilot’s last broadcast to overfly the last known position of the accident airplane. While proceeding to the area, the pilot reported that he was unable to see anything and that it was “really really black” and “very hazy,” but he could see lights on the shoreline. Before departing the area, he stated to the controller, “…glad I’ve got an autopilot out here because out in the bay as you’re turning its ah really hard to see anything.”

An alert notice for the missing airplane was issued by the FAA at 2216 and the Leon County Sheriff’s Office, Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) were notified for search and rescue.

The next day, at 0028, during a search conducted by the USCG and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, the wreckage of the airplane was discovered in 13 to 15 feet of water. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONFAA records indicated that the pilot did not hold an instrument rating. His pilot logbook was not located, and his recent flight experience could not be determined. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane’s maintenance records were not located. A friend of the pilot reported that the airplane’s autopilot had been upgraded within the past year, but that the pilot was, “having some problems with it.” METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONReview of weather information revealed no frontal boundaries, low-pressure systems, or weather echoes in the vicinity of the accident site. The 2200 High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model sounding for the approximate location of the accident site identified a mostly conditionally unstable environment from the surface through 14,000 ft, with two stable layer areas approximately 500 ft thick around 2,250 ft and around 5,000 ft. The complete Rawinsonde Observation program (RAOB) indicated a 500-ft-thick cloud layer around 4,000 ft. No icing was indicated below 14,000 ft. Animation of the visible satellite imagery on the date of the accident during the evening and through sunset indicated cloud cover moving southward. There were no non-convective or convective SIGMET advisories valid for the accident site at the accident time. Few to broken cloud cover at the accident site location with cloud bases around 4,000 ft and cloud tops above 16,000 ft were noted.

At the time of the accident, the sun and moon were below the horizon. A pilot reported encountering haze about 11 minutes before the accident when flying at 2,000 ft, 5 miles east-southeast of Tallahassee Municipal Airport (TLH).

A search of archived information indicated that the accident pilot did not request weather information from Leidos Flight Service or ForeFlight. It is unknown what weather information, if any, the accident pilot checked or received before or during the accident flight. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane’s maintenance records were not located. A friend of the pilot reported that the airplane’s autopilot had been upgraded within the past year, but that the pilot was, “having some problems with it.” WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the recovered wreckage revealed that the aft fuselage, with the empennage still attached, was separated from the remainder of the fuselage structure just aft of the instrument panel. The wings and carry-through structure had also separated from the fuselage.

Flight control continuity was established from the rudder, elevator, and ailerons through breaks in the system to their respective flight controls. The wing flaps were in the 0° (retracted) position, which matched the flap handle, and all landing gear were in the Up position, which also matched the position of the landing gear selector handle.

The rudder and both elevators remained attached. The left elevator displayed minimal damage; the right elevator’s lower panel was impact-separated from the rest of the right elevator.

The manifold pressure gauge and the tachometer displayed off-scale low values. The airspeed indicator needle was frozen around 190 knots. The vacuum-driven attitude indicator displayed a nose-down pitch attitude and left bank. The electric turn coordinator displayed a left bank. The directional gyro indicated 202°, and the vertical speed indicator was frozen at a 600-ft-per-minute rate of descent. Disassembly examination of the attitude indicator and the turn coordinator revealed slight rotational scoring of internal components of both instruments, consistent with operation at the time of impact and no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

The switches for the navigation lights, electric fuel pump, and turn coordinator were on, while the autopilot switch was off.

Examination of the engine powertrain, ignition, lubrication, fuel supply system, and fuel metering systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Disassembly examination of the engine-driven vacuum pump revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONSpatial Disorientation
According to FAA-H-8083-15B, Instrument Flying Handbook, the Coriolis Illusion occurs when a pilot has been in a turn long enough for the fluid in the ear canal to move at the same speed as the canal. A movement of the head in a different plane, such as looking at something in a different part of the flight deck, may set the fluid moving and create the illusion of turning or accelerating on an entirely different axis. This action causes the pilot to think the aircraft is doing a maneuver it is not. The disoriented pilot may maneuver the aircraft into a dangerous attitude in an attempt to correct the aircraft’s perceived attitude. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONA postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by District Two Medical Examiner’s Office, Tallahassee, Florida. The cause of death was listed as basilar skull fractures and traumatic brain jury due to blunt trauma of the head and neck. The manner of death was accident.

Toxicology testing performed by the FAA’s Forensic Services Laboratory revealed negative results for carboxyhemoglobin and drugs of abuse. Ethanol (11 mg/dL) was detected in the cavity blood specimen, but was not detected in the vitreous specimen.

The 82-year-old pilot’s autopsy identified some evidence of hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, including intermittent coronary artery plaque without significant narrowing and moderate aortic plaque.

Ethanol is the intoxicating alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor, and, if consumed, can impair judgment, psychomotor performance, cognition, and vigilance. FAA regulation imposes strict limits on flying after consuming ethanol, including a prohibition on piloting a civil aircraft while having a blood ethanol level of 0.04 g/dL or greater. Alcohol consumption is not the only possible source of ethanol in postmortem specimens. Ethanol sometimes may be produced by microbes in a person’s body tissues and fluids after death. Postmortem ethanol production is made more likely by traumatic injury, which can spread microbes. Typically, vitreous fluid is the specimen type best protected against microbial contamination and therefore is less susceptible to postmortem ethanol production than other specimen types.