LUSCOMBE 8A

Full Narrative

On July 17, 2016, about 0850 Pacific daylight time, a Luscombe 8A, N2759K, nosed over during a precautionary landing at Minden-Tahoe Airport (MEV), Minden, Nevada. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The airline transport pilot and the passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage as a result of the nose over. The local area flight originated from MEV at 0810. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed.

The pilot reported that during the takeoff rotation, he heard a noise that seemed to be coming from the landing gear. Once airborne, the passenger observed the right wheel, including the axle assembly, hanging sideways from the brake cable.

The pilot made a low pass for ground personnel to confirm the problem, and requested emergency equipment. The pilot flew around the airport for approximately 40 minutes until the emergency equipment was in place. The pilot elected to land on a grassy area between runway 34 and taxiway alpha. The pilot landed on the left wheel first, holding the right side of the airplane off the ground as long as possible. The right gear leg skidded for approximately 50 feet before digging in and causing the airplane to cartwheel onto its back.

Post-crash investigation by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that the right main gear leg failed at the axle cluster. The inspector observed internal corrosion within the axle cluster of the main gear leg. He noted that the upper portion of the leg was not sealed.

The information provided indicated that the failed cluster had current Univair aircraft corporation part numbers and nomenclature.

The Type Certificate holder provided a copy of a Service Recommendation (SR) #4 issued on January 22, 1996. The purpose of the SR was to facilitate the annual inspection of the Luscombe landing gear. It noted that corrosion damage within the 2 inches above the axle weldment had led to failure of the main landing gear legs. The SR provided instructions to examine for compromised structure. It also provided a solution by drilling a hole in the metal to allow moisture to drain out, and let drying air flow in to keep corrosion to a minimum. The owner stated that this SR had not been accomplished on this airplane. Compliance with the SR was not required by federal regulations for this type of operation.