BLUE RACER MIDSTREAM, LLC

hazardous_liquid Incident — — October 28, 2014

Incident Information

Incident DateOctober 28, 2014
OperatorBLUE RACER MIDSTREAM, LLC
CommodityHVL OR OTHER FLAMMABLE OR TOXIC FLUID WHICH IS A GAS AT AMBI
Pipeline Typehazardous_liquid

Location

State
Coordinates39.78484, -80.96325

Cause

CauseOTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE
SubcauseNEARBY INDUSTRIAL, MAN-MADE, OR OTHER FIRE/EXPLOSION AS PRIMARY CAUSE OF ACCIDENT

Casualties

Fatalities0
Injuries0

Costs

Property Damage$2,034,000
Emergency Response$140,000
Other Costs$0

Location Map

Incident Narrative

AFTER PACKING AN 8"" CONDENSATE PIPELINE, THE LINE RUPTURED AT AN EXPOSED AREA THAT HAD BEEN FILLED WITH FOAM BREAKERS TO MITIGATE SLIPPAGE. STRESS ENGINEERING (SES) PROVIDED TECHNICAL SUPPORT DURING THE INSPECTION OF THE FAILED SECTION OF PIPELINE, AND CONDUCTED THE METALURGICAL INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF THE PROPOSED EXPLANATION THAT THE FOAM BREAKERS COMBUSTED WHICH CAUSED THE PIPELINE TO RUPTURE. SES WAS ONSITE FOR AN INSPECTION ON OCTOBER 30TH THROUGH NOVEMBER 4TH, 2014 AND HAD ACCESS TO THE RUPTURE SITE ON NOVEMBER 1ST AND NOVEMBER 3RD, 2014. SES PERFORMED A PRELIMINARY VISUAL EXAMINATION AND PROVIDED A CUT PLAN TO REMOVE THE FAILED 8-INCH PIPE FROM THE LINE ON NOVEMBER 4TH, 2014. ON NOVEMBER 7TH, 2014, SES PROVIDED A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY REPORT ENTITLED ""INSPECTION OF AN 8-INCH PIPELINE"" TO REPORT OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING SES'S SITE INSPECTION. THIS REPORT INCLUDED PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION OF THE RUPTURE SITE AND A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE OBSERVATIONS MADE WHILE ONSITE. EARLY IN THIS INVESTIGATION SES CONSIDERED VARIOUS DAMAGE MECHANISMS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMON FAILURES, AND DEEMED THEM AS NOT LIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED; HOWEVER, THESE MECHANISMS WERE EXPLORED FURTHER FOR ADDED CONFIRMATION DURING THE INVESTIGATION. THIS INCLUDED, BUT WAS NOT LIMITED TO, STRESS CORROSION CRACKING, WALL LOSS DUE TO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL CORROSION, AND SERVICE RELATED FATIGUE. NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH DAMAGE MECHANISMS WERE OBSERVED DURING THE INVESTIGATION. IN ADDITION, DAMAGES ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORT AND CONSTRUCTION RELATED ACTIVITY, SUCH AS MECHANICAL DENTS OR GOUGES, WERE ALSO CONSIDERED. NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH MECHANISMS WERE OBSERVED DURING THE INVESTIGATION. ON NOVEMBER 15TH, 2014, SES PROVIDED A PRE-INSPECTION PROTOCOL THAT WOULD ALLOW SES TO PREPARE THE FORMAL METALLURGICAL TESTING PROTOCOL, WHICH WAS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 24TH, 2014. ON DECEMBER 4TH AND 5TH, 2014, THE LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS WERE CONDUCTED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF SES PERSONNEL AND IN THE PRESENCE OF PERSONNEL FROM UNIFIED INVESTIGATIONS AND SCIENCES AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERT ANALYSIS. MODIFICATIONS TO THE TESTING PROTOCOL WERE MADE DURING THE LABORATORY EXAMINATION AS AGREED TO BY THOSE ATTENDING THE INSPECTION. BASED ON THE COMPLETED ANALYSES, SES CONCLUDED THAT THE RUPTURE OCCURRED DUE TO THE LOSS OF MATERIAL STRENGTH, SUBSEQUENT BULGING, AND WALL THINNING ALL CAUSED BY LOCALLY OVERHEATED LINE PIPE MATERIAL IN COMBINATION WITH THE INTERNAL PIPELINE PRESSURE. THE LOCAL OVERHEATING AND THE INTERNAL PRESSURE REDUCED THE PRESSURE REQUIRED TO RUPTURE THE PIPELINE JOINT OF INTEREST BY LOWERING THE MATERIAL STRENGTH AND REDUCING THE WALL THICKNESS.

About This Pipeline Incident

Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.

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