HOLLY ENERGY PARTNERS - OPERATING, L.P.
hazardous_liquid Incident —
Incident Information
| Report Date | — |
| Operator | HOLLY ENERGY PARTNERS - OPERATING, L.P. |
| Commodity | — |
| Pipeline Type | hazardous_liquid |
Location
| State | |
| Coordinates | 34.99846, -106.02382 |
Cause
| Cause | EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| Subcause | — |
Casualties
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
Costs
| Property Damage | — |
| Lost Commodity | — |
| Public/Private Damage | — |
| Emergency Response | — |
| Environmental Remediation | — |
| Other Costs | — |
Location Map
Incident Narrative
1/15/16 AT ABOUT 19:00 MORIARTY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICERS (RESPONDING TO A 911 CALL FROM AN UNKNOWN CALLER REPORTING A FIRE), ARRIVED AT HEP'S MORIARTY TERMINAL, MORIARTY, NM. UPON ARRIVAL, THE THREE MORIARTY POLICE OFFICERS MADE ENTRY TO THE TERMINAL WITH HAND HELD FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, EXTINGUISHING THE FIRE ON UNIT 2. AT 19:17 MORIARTY FIRE DEPARTMENT ALERTED HEP CONTROL CENTER TO THE REPORTED FIRE AT HEP MORIARTY TERMINAL. AT 19:17 THE CONTROL CENTER DISPATCHED HEP TERMINAL TECH, WHO CONTACTED HEP TERMINAL SUPERVISOR AT 19:25. HEP TERMINAL TECH ARRIVED TO THE TERMINAL AT ABOUT 19:30, AND HEP TERMINAL SUPERVISOR ARRIVED @ 19:35. HEP CONTROL CENTER WAS NOTIFIED TO SHUT UNIT 2 DOWN. THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE A FAILURE OF THE UNIT 2 INBOARD BEARING THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INBOARD SEAL FAIL. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE SEAL FAILED IN SUCH A WAY THAT ADEQUATE PRESSURE DID NOT TRANSMIT TO THE SEAL FAIL DIAPHRAGM SWITCH RESULTING IN NO ALARM ACTIVATION AND NO AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF THE PUMP UNIT BY THE CONTROLS SYSTEM. THE SEAL FAILURE ALLOWED PRODUCT (GASOLINE) BEING RELEASED TO ENTER THE INBOARD BEARING OIL RESERVOIR THROUGH THE SHAFT LABYRINTH SEAL. THE GASOLINE IN THE BEARING HOUSING DILUTED THE LUBRICITY OF THE BEARING OIL TO THE POINT THAT THE BEARING OVERHEATED. THE OVERHEATING OF THE BEARING RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO THE PUMP UNIT SHAFT THAT BEGAN TEARING ITSELF APART AND CREATED AN IGNITION SOURCE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BEARING TEMPERATURE INCREASE DID NOT ACTIVATE AN ALARM DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THE BEARING RTD (RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR). THE BEARING RTD MEASURED THE TEMPERATURE OF THE LUBRICATING OIL BATH IN THE BEARING HOUSING WHICH WAS BEING COOLED BY THE FLOOD OF COLD PRODUCT REPLACING THE LUBRICATING OIL. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. UNIT RETROFIT AND INSTALLATION OF TANDEM MECHANICAL SEALS AS WELL AS REPLACING THE LABYRINTH SEAL DESIGN. 2. RELOCATION OF THE BEARING RTD TO READ ACTUAL BEARING TEMPERATURE AND NOT THE LUBRICATING OIL TEMPERATURE. 3. INSTALLATION OF STATION ""FIRE EYE"" FLAME DETECTORS-TO ADD A LAYER OF SAFETY TO DETECT A FLAME AND ENABLE THE CONTROLS SYSTEM TO ALARM THE CONTROL CENTER, SHUT DOWN THE PUMPS AND IMPROVE RESPONSE TIME AND SAFETY.
About This Pipeline Incident
Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.