COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES CRUDE TRANSPORTATION, LLC

Incident Narrative

ON JULY 18TH AT APPROXIMATELY 10:12 AM, 24 BARRELS OF CRUDE OIL WAS RELEASED ONTO COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES CRUDE TRANSPORTATION, LLC (CRCT) PROPERTY AFTER A GASKET FAILED AT A 16' PIPELINE FLANGE. THE GASKET RUPTURED WHILE CRCT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AND THE REMOTE OPERATIONS CONTROL (ROC), A THIRD PARTY OPERATION COMPANY, WERE CONDUCTING POINT CHECKS ON THE AUTOMATED VALVES AT THE COFFEYVILLE EAST TANK FARM (ETF) FACILITY. DURING THE START OF THE POINT CHECK PROCESS THE ROC RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FACILITY P&ID'S WHICH IDENTIFIED VALVES USING A DIFFERENT NOMENCLATURE FROM WHAT MOST CRCT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL USE AT THE ETF. ROC PERSONNEL ASKED FOR APPROVAL TO OPERATE VALVE V-201F WHICH IS KNOWN AS 22A-1 FILL VALVE BY CRCT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. THIS VALVE IS LOCATED ON A MANIFOLD SYSTEM CONTAINING THREE VALVES WITH EACH VALVE SPECIFIC TO FILLING ONE OF THREE FACILITY CRUDE OIL STORAGE TANKS. WHEN CRCT PERSONNEL ACKNOWLEDGED APPROVAL FOR THE ROC TO POINT CHECK VALVE V-201F, THE ROC WAS NOT AWARE THIS WAS THE ACTIVE VALVE FILLING TANK 22A-1 AND CRCT PERSONNEL DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE REQUEST AS THE 22A-1 FILL VALVE. AS THE VALVE BEGAN TO TRAVEL TO THE CLOSED POSITION, CRCT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL REALIZED THIS WAS THE INCORRECT VALVE AND REQUESTED THE ROC TO REVERSE THE VALVE TRAVEL TO PREVENT SHUTTING IN THE PIPELINE. THE ROC COULD NOT REVERSE THE TRAVEL UNTIL IT COMPLETELY CYCLED TO THE CLOSED POSITION. THIS VALVE CLOSURE RESULTED IN A PRESSURE INCREASE AT THE MANIFOLD CONTAINING VALVE V-201F. THE INCREASE IN PRESSURE RESULTED IN A PUMP SHUT DOWN, HOWEVER THE GASKET RUPTURED ON THE PIPING MANIFOLD RELEASING CRUDE OIL. CRCT PERSONNEL AND THE REFINERY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM WERE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED TO BEGIN CLEAN-UP ACTIVITIES. AGENCY NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE WITHIN A TIMELY MANNER WITH AN ESTIMATED RELEASE VOLUME AND UPDATED THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH A REVISED SPILL AMOUNT. THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION DETERMINED A COMMUNICATION ISSUE BETWEEN CRCT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AND THE ROC USING DIFFERENT NOMENCLATURE. THE PRESSURES EXPERIENCED LOCALLY AT THE MANIFOLD WERE WITHIN TOLERANCES FOR THE GASKET. FAILURE OF THE GASKET WAS LIKELY DUE TO EITHER A LATENT MATERIAL DEFECT OR INCORRECT INSTALLATION. CRCT HAS CONDUCTED A FORMAL ROOT CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED UPON REQUEST.