FIELDWOOD ENERGY, LLC

Incident Narrative

ACCORDING TO THE OPERATORS ON SHIFT THAT DAY, AT APPROXIMATELY 17:00 ON THE EVENING OF 06/14/20, DURING THE ROUTINE TRANSFER OPERATION MENTIONED ABOVE, THE LEVELS IN TANK 5 EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF THE FLANGE OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM AND CONTINUOUSLY LEAKED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 02:00 ON 06/15/20. THE CAUSE WAS ORIGINALLY DETERMINED TWO (2) DISCS OF THE FOAM CHAMBERS RUPTURED ALLOWING OIL TO START LEAKING OUT OF THE ANNULAR AIR HOLES ON THE PIPING JUST BELOW THE CHAMBER. HOWEVER DURING REPAIR OPERATIONS IT WAS DISCOVERED THE PLATES DID NOT RUPTURE BUT INSTEAD WERE FOUND TO BE INCORRECTLY INSTALLED. THE FOAM CHAMBERS INSTALLED AT THE FACILITY ARE INSTALLED FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION OF THE FIXED ROOF TANK AND HAVE BEEN IN PLACE PRIOR TO THE 2005 INTEGRITY TEST ON FILE. THEY ARE INSTALLED ON THE SIDE WALL OF VERTICAL STORAGE TANKS ABOVE THE MAXIMUM PRODUCT STORAGE LEVEL. THE CHAMBERS ARE DESIGNED TO APPLY AN EXPANDED FOAM BLANKET OVER THE SURFACE OF A FLAMMABLE LIQUID FIRE WITHIN THE TANK. THE ANNULAR HOLES ON THE PIPING BELOW THE CHAMBER ARE DESIGNED TO ALLOW AIR TO MIX WITH THE FOAM SOLUTION TO CREATE THE FOAM BEFORE IT ENTERS THE TANK. DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT FIELDWOOD DISCOVERED THAT THE OVERFILL OF THE TANK #5 WAS DUE TO OPERATOR ERROR AND POOR CALCULATIONS. THE OPERATOR BELIEVED HE HAD ROOM FOR AN ADDITIONAL 4200 BBLS HOWEVER DURING HIS CALCULATING OF TANK FILL HE ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION OF THE FLANGE LEVEL OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. WHEN THE SAFETY DEVICES ALERTED OF POTENTIAL OVERFILL HE PLACED THE DEVICES IN BYPASS BELIEVING HIS CALCULATIONS WERE ACCURATE. TO PLACE THE SAFETY DEVICE IN BYPASS THE HIGH ALARMS AT THE FACILITY ARE AIR ACTUATED ALARMS THAT CAN BE HEARD FROM ANY LOCATION ON THE FACILITY. WHEN THE ALARM IS TRIGGERED IT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED AND SILENCED BY FACILITY PERSONNEL FROM ONE OF TWO TERMINALS (LOCATED WITHIN THE OFFICE & MCC BUILDING). FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION FIELDWOOD DID THE FOLLOWING: OFFSHORE PRODUCTION FOREMEN/OPERATION LEAD HAVE INCREASED THEIR PRESENCE ON THE GRAND ISLE TANK BATTERY. THEY SPEND ONE FULL DAY A WEEK ON LOCATION TO EVALUATE PERSONNEL AND WALK THE GROUNDS. DAILY CALLS WILL BE MADE ALONG WITH AN EMAIL OF ALL ACTIVITIES AM/PM WILL BE SENT TO THE PRODUCTION FOREMAN AND PRODUCTION SUPERINTENDENT. WEEKLY CHECKLIST ALONG WITH PINC'S WILL BE DONE AND DISCUSSED ON DAILY CALL. FIELDWOOD HSE PERSONNEL WILL INCREASE SITE VISITS TO THIS FACILITY AND ACCOMPANY THE PIC TO THE GITB YARD FOR A WALK AROUND EVALUATION. BOTH CONTRACT OPERATORS INVOLVED WITH THIS INCIDENT WERE RELIEVED OF THEIR DUTIES WITH FIELDWOOD. FIELDWOOD ADDED AN ADDITIONAL OPERATOR GOING FROM 2 TO 3 PERSONNEL. ALL OPERATIONS GROUPS UNDERWENT REFRESHER TRAINING FOR WHO TO REPORT ANY CONCERNS OR INCIDENTS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION. FIELDWOOD WILL INCREASE SURPRISE MIMIC SPILL DRILLS TO VERIFY ALL PERSONNEL ON LOCATION ARE PREPARED AND UNDERSTAND WHAT IS EXPECTED AND HOW TO RESPOND.