SCOUT ENERGY MANAGEMENT LLC
hazardous_liquid Incident —
Incident Information
| Report Date | — |
| Operator | SCOUT ENERGY MANAGEMENT LLC |
| Commodity | — |
| Pipeline Type | hazardous_liquid |
Location
| State | |
| Coordinates | 41.53697, -109.36890 |
Cause
| Cause | EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| Subcause | — |
Casualties
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
Costs
| Property Damage | — |
| Lost Commodity | — |
| Public/Private Damage | — |
| Emergency Response | — |
| Environmental Remediation | — |
| Other Costs | — |
Location Map
Incident Narrative
4-16-2023 AT 0641 SCOUT CONTROL ROOM RECEIVED A CO2 PURCHASE PRESSURE ALARM GENERATED (PT9206) FROM THE CO2 REINJECTION FACILITIES CONTROL SYSTEM. CONTROLLER CALLED EXXON, THEY REPORTED NO PROBLEMS IN THEIR SYSTEM. PLANT OPERATOR PERFORMED A CO2 PLANT CHECK AND FOUND NO ISSUES. AT 0657 CONTROLLER CONTACTED PLANT FOREMAN (MIKE WILEY) AND WAS ADVISED TO SHUT FLOW CONTROL VALVE 9200, FOLLOWED BY EXXON SHUTTING THEIR VALVES AT 0702. CONTROLLER CLOSED RICHARDS GAP BLOCK VALVE MOV-19 AT 0715, WE THEN RECEIVED A LOW-PRESSURE ALARM FOR RICHARDS GAP (1685 PSI) AT 0721 AND ROCK SPRINGS (1619 PSI) AT 0722, THIS INDICATED AN ISSUE BETWEEN OUR POINT OF RECEIVING FROM EXXON TO RICHARDS GAP. CONTROLLER ALSO CLOSED ROCK SPRINGS BLOCK VALVE MOV 48-0 AT 0738. AT 0800 EXXON'S CONTROL ROOM CALLED SCOUTS CONTROL ROOM REPORTING A LEAK AT THE METER NORTH OF INTERSTATE 80 NEAR ROCK SPRINGS WYOMING. CONTROL ROOM DISPATCHED MECHANIC CODY SMUIN TO CLOSE MILE MARKER 53 BLOCK VALVE. AT 0847 CODY NOTIFIED THE CONTROL ROOM THAT HE IS 20 MINUTES OUT FROM BLOCK VALVE 53 AND THAT HE IS GOING TO CONFIRM WITH PLANT FOREMAN TO CLOSE BLOCK VALVE 53. AT 0857 CODY SUGGESTED TO THE PLANT FOREMAN THAT HE SHOULD GO TO ROCK SPRINGS INSTEAD OF BLOCK VALVE 53. CODY IDENTIFIED LEAKING PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE 48-1. AT 0914 CONTROL ROOM RECEIVED MOTOR OPERATED VALVE- LOCAL/REMOTE ALARM FOLLOWED BY A BUILDING INTRUSION ALARM FROM CODY BEING ONSITE, SWITCHING THE VALVE TO LOCAL AND SHUTTING MOV 48-1. AT 0925 CODY ISOLATED PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE 48-1 BY CLOSING HAND VALVE 48-11. PSV 48-1 FAILED OPEN, CAUSING THE CO2 RELEASE. UPON INVESTIGATION WE FOUND THAT THE ALARM PRESSURE SWITCH WAS NOT ACTIVE IN SCADA AND SHOULD HAVE ALARMED AT 50 PSIG FOR PSV- 48-1 BEING ACTIVE NOTIFYING THE CONTROL ROOM TO CLOSE MOV 48-1 TO ISOLATE THE FAILED PSV. WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH EMERSON/ ANDERSON GREENWOOD WHO MANUFACTURED THE FAILED PSV, ON 02/09/24 THEY HAVE ADVISED THAT WE SWITCH TO A 200 SERIES PILOT OPERATED SAFETY RELIEF VALVE AS WELL AS SWITCHING FROM A MODULATING ACTING VALVE TO A POP ACTING VALVE. WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR OUR C02 PIPELINE. OUR PSV'S ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REBUILT AND WILL BE INSTALLED BY EMERSON/ ANDERSON GREENWOOD TECHNICIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
About This Pipeline Incident
Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.