KINDER MORGAN TEJAS PIPELINE
gas_transmission Incident —
Incident Information
| Report Date | — |
| Operator | KINDER MORGAN TEJAS PIPELINE |
| Commodity | — |
| Pipeline Type | gas_transmission |
Location
| State | |
| Coordinates | 29.72060, -95.11285 |
Cause
| Cause | MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD |
| Subcause | — |
Casualties
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
Costs
| Property Damage | — |
| Lost Commodity | — |
| Public/Private Damage | — |
| Emergency Response | — |
| Environmental Remediation | — |
| Other Costs | — |
Location Map
Incident Narrative
INTEGRITY WORK HAD BEEN EXECUTED FOR THE PREVIOUS FEW WEEKS ON THIS SYSTEM. DURING EXECUTION OF THE WORK, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A TAP VALVE ON 8 INCH PIPING BRANCHING OFF THE 12 INCH 202-412 LINE WAS LEAKING BY. THE VALVE WAS REPLACED DURING THIS TIME. AS PART OF THAT EFFORT, IT WAS NOTED BY THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM THAT THE PIPE IN THIS AREA WAS LEANING/SAGGING CAUSING THE TAP VALVE TO BE POSITIONED AT AN ANGLE. BECAUSE OF THIS, ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE INSTALLED UNDER THE NEW TAP VALVE, TO HELP RELIEVE STRESS ON THE PIPE. NOTE, THE ORIGINAL TAP VALVE DID HAVE 12X12 4INCH CONCRETE SUPPORTS. AFTER EXECUTING THE COMPLIANCE REQUIRED PIPELINE INTEGRITY WORK, THE PIPELINE HAD BEEN PUT BACK IN SERVICE ON 7/11/2014. AT APPROXIMATELY 8:00 AM, ON 7/12/2014, A CONTRACTOR ARRIVED AT THE SITE TO COMPLETE BACKFILL AND CLEANUP OF WORK LOCATION. WHILE BACKFILLING DIRT, THE CONTRACTOR NOTICED FUMES FROM THE GROUND IN THE AREA OF THE TAP VALVE. ANOTHER CONTRACTOR STOPPED THE WORK ACTIVITY AND CONTACTED KINDER MORGAN OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. AT 13:00, THE LEAK WAS CONFIRMED BY VISUAL INSPECTION TO BE IN THE AREA OF THE MAIN PIPE SLEEVE UPSTREAM OF THE TAP VALVE WHERE IT CONNECTED WITH THE 12 INCH 202-412 LINE. AT 16:35 THE PIPELINE WAS SHUTDOWN. UPON FURTHER VISUAL EXAMINATION, THE LEAK APPEARED TO BE AT THE WELD POINT OF THE TRANSITION BRANCH OF THE 12 INCH 202-412 TO THE 8 INCH PIPING. THE DEFECT WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO BE ANALYZED BY A METALLURGICAL LAB. THE METALLURGICAL LAB ANALYZED THE SAMPLE AND CAME BACK WITH 4 CONCLUSIONS. 1. THE BRANCH CONNECTION FAILED DUE TO AN OVERLOAD FRACTURE, LIKELY INCDUCED BY EXTERNAL BENDING LOADS. 2. EVIDENCE OF TIME DEPENDENT CRACKING MECHANISMS, SUCH AS HIGH OR LOW CYCLE FATIGUE WAS NOT OBSERVED. 3. INSUFFICIENT STRUCTURAL SUPPORT OF THE BRANCH CONNECTION COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE WELD FAILURE. 4. THE WELD CONTAINED DEFECTS SUCH AS LACK OF FUSION; HOWEVER, THIS DOD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE FAILURE.
About This Pipeline Incident
Pipeline incident data is reported to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). All significant incidents involving fatalities, injuries, or property damage over $50,000 must be reported.