STAGECOACH GAS SERVICES LLC

Incident Narrative

16:13; THE DEHYDRATION SYSTEM TRIGGERED A FLAMEOUT/PUMP FAILURE ALARM. A NEIGHBOR NOTIFIED A FORMER EMPLOYEE THAT THERE WAS AN ISSUE AT THE PLANT. SAID NEIGHBOR COULD SEE SMOKE AT THE BACK OF THE FACILITY AND CALLED 911. 16:28; THE FORMER EMPLOYEE CALLED THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR TO INFORM HIM OF THE NEIGHBOR'S REPORT. 16:29; THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR CALLED THE E&C TECHNICIAN TO DISCUSS INFORMATION AND ALARMS. THE E&C TECHNICIAN WAS DISPATCHED TO THE STATION. 17:06; THE E&C TECHNICIAN ARRIVED ONSITE AND CALLED THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR TO INFORM HIM OF AN ACTIVE FIRE AT THE WEST SIDE DEHYDRATION SKID. THE E&C TECHNICIAN IMMEDIATELY PERFORMED SITE SAFETY AWARENESS. 17:13; THE E&C TECHNICIAN MANUALLY ACTIVATED THE ESD SYSTEM AND THE FIRE SUBSIDED. 17:16; THE ESD ACTION WAS COMPLETE. THE E&C TECHNICIAN ALLOWED THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT TO ENTER THE STATION AND STAGE ON THE BACKSIDE OF THE COMPRESSOR BUILDING. 17:17; THE E&C TECHNICIAN NOTICED THERE WAS A SMALL FLICKER OF FLAME COMING FROM THE GLYCOL DRAIN BARREL AND HEARD A NOISE HEARD COMING FROM THE PNEUMATIC DEVICES. 17:22; THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR, THE E&C TECHNICIAN, AND THE OPERATIONS TECHNICIAN DETERMINED THE NOISE WAS THE AIR SUPPLY TO THE VAPOR RECOVER UNIT (VRU) CONTROLS. THE EMPLOYEES ENTERED THE DEHYDRATION AREA WITH HANDHELD FIRE EXTINGUISHERS TO EXTINGUISH ANY FLAME OR FIRE AT THE GLYCOL BARREL. 17:35; THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR REPORTED TO THE OPERATIONS MANAGER THAT SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE HAD OCCURRED TO THE VRU UNIT AND DEHYDRATION SKID. 17:45; THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE LINE CALL, REQUIRED BY PROCEDURE OM 159, WAS CONDUCTED. THE EVENT WAS DEEMED REPORTABLE TO THE NRC ON THE BASIS OF COSTS. AT THIS TIME, THE SCENE WAS SECURED AND PRESERVED UNTIL A CORPORATE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS TEAM WAS DEPLOYED TO THE STATION. INVESTIGATION CONFIRMED THE FOLLOWING: NO PERSONNEL WERE ON SITE AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT AND THE DEHYDRATION UNIT WAS NOT IN GAS DRYING SERVICE BUT WAS IN STANDBY SERVICE AS THE STATION WAS INJECTING GAS INTO THE STORAGE FIELD. WITH THE HIGH AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND NO WITHDRAWAL FROM STORAGE OCCURRING, THE MAIN BURNER WOULD HAVE LITTLE NEED TO OPERATE. WITHOUT THE MAIN BURNER OPERATING, ONLY PILOT FUEL GAS WOULD BE USED BY THE SYSTEM. WITH NO OUTLET FOR FUEL GAS TO BE USED, THE CONTACTOR WOULD BE A SOURCE OF ADDITIONAL GAS PRESSURE TO THE SEPARATOR WHICH IN TURN FEEDS THE FUEL GAS TRAIN TO THE SECONDARY LIQUID KNOCKOUT VESSEL, THE LOCATION OF THE THERMAL RELIEF VALVE. SAID THERMAL RELIEF VALVE, TYPICALLY SET AT 125 PSIG, ACTIVATED WITH THE VENT PIPING DIRECTING GAS TOWARDS THE GROUND WHICH CONTAINS GRAVEL AND OTHER MATERIAL WHICH MOST LIKELY CAUSED STATIC ELECTRICAL CHARGES CREATING THE IGNITION SOURCE. OBSERVATION FOUND THE HISTORIC VENT PIPING FOR THE THERMAL RELIEF VALVE WAS TERMINATED APPROXIMATELY ONE (1) FOOT ABOVE GRADE SURFACE WHICH DOES NOT MEET CURRENT KINDER MORGAN DESIGN CRITERIA. FLAME RETARDANT TARPS ARE USED FOR WINTER PROTECTION OF THE DEHYDRATION EQUIPMENT. DUE TO WIND, THE TARP BY THE KNOCKOUT VESSEL CAUGHT ON FIRE. 16:17 DATA SCAN SUPPORTS A SMALL INCREASE IN GAS FLOW FROM THE THERMAL RELIEF VALVE AT THE KNOCKOUT VESSEL. 16:17, A DROP IN AIR PRESSURE WITHIN THE AIR SYSTEM INDICATED THE FIRE HAD SPREAD TO THE VRU UNIT. FIRE SPREAD TO THE TARP BY THE SEPARATOR. 16:30 DATA SCAN IDENTIFIES A LARGER GAS FLOW INCREASE WHICH IS SUSPECTED TO BE THE FIRE DAMAGED 1-INCH RELIEF VALVE ON THE SEPARATOR. STATION GAS FLOW CONTINUES TO BYPASS THE DEHYDRATION AREA UNTIL ALL REPAIRS AND MODIFICATIONS ARE COMPLETED. ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 1, 2023, A REPLACEMENT DEHYDRATION EQUIPMENT SKID WILL BE INSTALLED, ANY RELATED VENTS WILL BE VERIFIED AS MEETING KINDER MORGAN DESIGN CRITERIA OR MODIFIED AS NEEDED, AND A DESIGN REVIEW WILL BE CONDUCTED OF POSSIBLE INSTALLATION OF PRESSURE LIMITING DEVICE SENSING PRESSURE TO THE DEHYDRATION SKID TO SHUT IN THE CONTACTOR AS NECESSARY.