2026 TESLA CYBERTRUCK

2 recalls, 9 complaints

WHEELS:LUGS/NUTS/BOLTS/STUDS

Defect Description

Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024-2026 Cybertruck vehicles equipped with 18-inch steel wheels. The brake rotor stud holes may crack and allow the stud to separate from the wheel hub.

Consequence

Wheel stud separation can cause a loss of vehicle control, increasing the risk of a crash.

Remedy

Tesla Service will replace the front and rear brake rotors, hubs, and lug nuts, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 20, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-33-003.

173 vehicles affected

Manufacturer: Tesla, Inc.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:SOFTWARE

Defect Description

Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024-2026 Cybertruck vehicles operating software prior to 2025.38.3. The vehicle controller software may cause the front parking lights to be too bright and exceed the maximum light output, adversely affecting the vision of other drivers. As such, these vehic... Read more

Consequence

Parking lights that are too bright can reduce visibility of oncoming drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.

Remedy

Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 12, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-00-008.

63,619 vehicles affected

Manufacturer: Tesla, Inc.

Complaint Statistics

9 total complaints 1 crashes

Top Reported Components

Component	Complaints
ENGINE	3
POWER TRAIN	2
BACK OVER PREVENTION	1
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	1
STEERING	1
UNKNOWN OR OTHER	1

Incident date: Jun 15, 2026

2026 Tesla Cybertruck was in Full Self Driving mode when backing out of a parking space. The Cybertruck backed into a parked car causing damage to both vehicles and whiplash of Cybertruck occupants. The Cybertruck accelerated backwards from 1 mph to 4 mph instantly. There is vehicle video footage ... Read more

Crash

Incident date: May 7, 2026

Purchased truck on May 5th. May 7th scuba valve went bed causing air suspension failure. Low voltage system had critical safety failure causing loss of steering and throttle control. Received vehicle back from Tesla shop said they could not repay the issue. Next day while driving system had total lo... Read more

Incident date: May 7, 2026

No warnings lights given. My car has been serviced three times in the past year of owning it. Yesterday I was informed my entire transmission needs to be replaced as it failed its inspection. My car was last seen by Toyota in September and I paid a little under 2k each visit to keep my car running p... Read more

Incident date: Apr 2, 2026

I own a 2011 Hyundai Tucson (VIN: [XXX] ). The vehicle had an engine replacement performed by Hyundai service. Immediately after picking up the car, I noticed a loud abnormal noise coming from underneath the vehicle. I reported the issue right away, but was told nothing was heard and it was dismiss... Read more

Incident date: Apr 2, 2026

The contact owns a 2018 Honda Odyssey. While driving at an undisclosed speed, there was an abnormal ticking sound coming from the vehicle. The accelerator pedal was depressed; however, the vehicle failed to accelerate as intended. In addition, the contact became aware that there was smoke coming fro... Read more

Incident date: Apr 2, 2026

My 2022 Ram 1500 TRX has recurring safety-related failures of the infotainment system affecting Uconnect 5 (12” screen). These issues are widespread in 2021–2024 Ram TRX and Ram 1500 models and began or worsened after forced over-the-air updates. The primary defect is black-screen failures whil... Read more

Incident date: Mar 8, 2026

The engine in my 2021 Hyundai Palisade experienced sudden loss of oil leading to engine failure. The vehicle had been regularly serviced and maintained at a Hyundai dealership according to recommended intervals. During multiple service visits, the dealership informed me the vehicle was low on oil. ... Read more

Incident date: Oct 2, 2025

The contact owns a 2015 Lincoln MKC. The contact received notification of NHTSA Campaign Number: 25V270000 (Back Over Prevention); however, the part to do the recall repair was not yet available. The contact stated that the rearview camera image was distorted while reversing. The vehicle was taken t... Read more

NHTSA Safety Investigations, TESLA CYBERTRUCK

Investigations opened by NHTSA into potential safety defects. These are separate from recalls and may or may not result in a recall.

EA, Open , Model Year: 2023

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering... reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.Read more

PE, Open , Model Year: 2023

Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traﬃc safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has label... ed as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traﬃc laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identiﬁed a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traﬃc safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The ﬁrst type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traﬃc signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traﬃc. With respect to the ﬁrst type of scenario, ODI has identiﬁed 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traﬃc signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traﬃc signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traﬃc signal. ODI has identiﬁed six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traﬃc signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identiﬁed 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identiﬁed 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.Read more

PE, Closed , Model Year: 2023

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions

On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway vi... sibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.Read more

RQ, Open , Model Year: 2024

Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla... Read more

TESLA CYBERTRUCK - All Years Overview

Complete safety history for the TESLA CYBERTRUCK across all model years (2024, 2026).

16 Total Recalls

291 Total Complaints

4 Investigations

24 Reported Crashes

8 Reported Fires

0 Reported Deaths

TESLA CYBERTRUCK - Year by Year

Compare recalls and complaints across model years. Click any year to see full details.

Year	Recalls	Complaints
2026 (current)	2	9
2025	3	33	View
2024	11	249	View

Other TESLA Models

Model	Recalls	Complaints
MODEL S	283	5,158	View
MODEL X	259	2,303	View
MODEL 3	232	7,192	View
MODEL Y	186	6,639	View
SEMI	2	6	View
ROADSTER2	1	2	View
ROADSTER	1	3	View
NEMA 10-30 ADAPTER	0	2	View

Vehicle Safety

Consumer Safety

Infrastructure

Public Health

2026 TESLA CYBERTRUCK

Complaint Statistics

Top Reported Components

NHTSA Safety Investigations, TESLA CYBERTRUCK

TESLA CYBERTRUCK - All Years Overview

TESLA CYBERTRUCK - Year by Year

Other TESLA Models