PIPER PA32RT

Full Narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn March 4, 2024, at 1943 central standard time, a Piper PA-32RT-300T, C-FBWH, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Nashville, Tennessee. The private pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The airplane departed under visual flight rules (VFR) from Brampton-Caledon Airport (CNC3), Brampton, Ontario, Canada, about 1222 and arrived at Erie International Airport/Tom Ridge Field (ERI) Erie, Pennsylvania, about 1 hour later. At ERI, the pilot added 11 gallons of fuel to each wing fuel tank. The pilot departed about 90 minutes later and flew to Mount Sterling/Montgomery County Airport (IOB), Mount Sterling, Kentucky, where he added a total of 52.1 gallons of fuel.
The third flight leg was from IOB to John C Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee, about 180 miles away. ADS-B and communications data provided by the FAA indicated that the airplane departed about 1915 during dusk, proceeded on a track of about 230°, and climbed to an enroute altitude of 10,500 ft above mean sea level (msl).
As the airplane transitioned into the airspace surrounding Nashville International Airport (BNA) on the way to JWN, the pilot was in communication with the Nashville Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). The approach controller issued the altimeter setting and runway in use before terminating radar services and issuing a frequency change. The pilot contacted the tower controller and stated that he was about 8 miles north of the airport. The controller acknowledged and told the pilot to report when he was five miles north. The pilot acknowledged.
After the pilot reported that he was five miles north and that he had the runway in sight, the tower controller cleared the pilot to land on runway 20 and requested the airplane type. The pilot responded “PA-32,” but did not read back the landing clearance.
Starting when the airplane was about three miles from the runway, its flight track was aligned with the runway centerline; however, about one mile from the runway, the airplane remained at an altitude of 2,500 ft msl. The pilot requested to “go around and come back to two zero.” The controller replied, “sir you can overfly the field and contact Nashville departure. I have multiple inbounds behind you sir.” The pilot acknowledged and stated he would contact departure. The reason for the pilot’s continued flight at 2,500 ft and the reason for the subsequent overflight was never communicated by the pilot, nor did the controller inquire about the reason.
As the pilot was overflying JWN at 2,500 ft msl, he contacted the departure controller and stated “Uhm, I’m overflying the field and 2,500 I need to come back to land.” The approach controller instructed the pilot to contact JWN tower; however, the pilot replied that he had been instructed to contact departure control.
As the pilot was at 2,500 ft msl and flying on a heading of about 210° south of the approach end of runway 2, the departure controller asked the pilot if he still had JWM in sight. The pilot stated that his engine “shut down.” The controller asked again if he was trying to land at JWN. The pilot responded with, “my engine turned off, I’m at one thousand, six hundred,” followed by, “I’m going to be landing, I don’t know where.” The airplane was descending through 1,200 ft msl when the departure controller declared an emergency and repeatedly cleared the pilot to land on runway 2. The pilot indicated that he had the runway in sight, but was too far away to make it, as he was descending through 900 ft msl (about 450 ft above ground level). No further transmissions were received from the pilot. Figure 1 shows the airplane’s flight track during the final portion of the flight.

Figure 1 - Profile view of final segment of accident flight track with time, altitude, ground speed, and heading information.
A review of video recordings from residential surveillance and vehicle traffic cameras revealed that, before impacting the ground, the airplane was on a track of about 080° as it descended over a residential neighborhood before passing over an interstate highway, where it impacted the shoulder of the interstate before it struck an embankment and caught fire. Multiple witnesses reported that they heard the airplane as it passed overhead and that the airplane sounded like it was having engine issues, with one witness stating the engine was, “sputtering and making popping sounds.” PERSONNEL INFORMATIONBased on available pilot records for review, the investigation determined that the pilot had accumulated about 200 total hours of flight experience as of February 22, 2024, about 10 days before the accident flight. Of those, 43.4 hours were flown in the accident airplane make model. The pilot’s documented total night flying experience was 18.5 hours. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONBased on available pilot records for review, the investigation determined that the pilot had accumulated about 200 total hours of flight experience as of February 22, 2024, about 10 days before the accident flight. Of those, 43.4 hours were flown in the accident airplane make model. The pilot’s documented total night flying experience was 18.5 hours. AIRPORT INFORMATIONBased on available pilot records for review, the investigation determined that the pilot had accumulated about 200 total hours of flight experience as of February 22, 2024, about 10 days before the accident flight. Of those, 43.4 hours were flown in the accident airplane make model. The pilot’s documented total night flying experience was 18.5 hours. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted terrain at an elevation of 440 ft msl about 2 nautical miles south of the approach end of runway 2 at JWM. The wreckage path was oriented on a heading about 076° magnetic, with the nose of the airplane oriented on a 273° magnetic heading. The wreckage field extended about 75 ft with the initial impact point consisting of a 6-ft-long ground scar. The gouge contained red position light lens fragments, and the left wingtip was resting adjacent to the initial impact point. During the accident sequence, the left fuel tank was breached, and a large postimpact fire largely consumed the left wing and fuselage.
All major components of the airplane were located in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The airframe remained upright, and the engine was found inverted, impact damaged, and exposed to heat, but was relatively intact. The impact and thermal damage were limited to the accessory section on the aft part of the engine.
The cockpit and cabin were destroyed by impact forces and fire, and most flight instrumentation and gauges were destroyed. The vertical speed indicator indicated -400 ft per minute and the manifold pressure/fuel flow gauge, which was thermally damaged, indicated 15 inches manifold pressure and zero gallons per hour fuel flow. The airplane was equipped with an electronic engine monitor that suffered significant thermal exposure. The unit was sent to the NTSB recorders laboratory for examination and download of the nonvolatile memory; however, the extensive nature of the fire damage rendered it inoperable and no data were recovered.
The three propeller blades remained attached to the hub and engine at the propeller flange. Two of the blades exhibited little to no chordwise scraping; one of the blades displayed a slight forward bend and minor polishing. There were no leading edge gouges. The propeller spinner was crushed and lacked rotational damage signatures. The propeller governor remained attached to the engine at the mounting pad and the control linkage remained attached to the control arm.
The engine crankshaft was rotated by hand through numerous rotations beyond 720°, and compression and suction were observed on all cylinders. There was no grinding or limitations to movement and crankshaft to camshaft continuity was confirmed. Valve actuation was confirmed. There was oil throughout the engine and in the oil sump; the oil filter was free of ferrous material or debris. The oil suction screen contained some foreign debris, but was not obstructed; the debris was sent to the NTSB Materials lab for analysis. The debris was not discovered in any other section of the engine or crankcase. Examination of the debris with a spectrometer indicated that the unknown material was a very strong match for polyethylene, a polymer commonly found in found in fuel lines, gaskets, and electrical wire insulation.
A borescope was inserted into each cylinder head and no anomalies were observed on the piston faces, valve faces, or cylinder walls. The turbocharger was found intact, and rotated smoothly when spun by hand. There was no damage to the compressor or bearings, nor was there any oil staining or discoloration.  
Both left and right magnetos were manually operated with a drill and both magnetos produced blue/purple spark at all terminal leads. All spark plugs displayed coloration consistent with normal engine operation and normal electrodes as compared to the Champion Aerospace AV-27 Check-A-Plug chart.
The fuel injector lines were tested with compressed air into the fuel line from the fuel servo. Fuel was present in the lines for cylinder Nos. 1, 3, and 5. No fuel was present in the injectors for cylinders Nos. 2, 4, and 6. There were no obstructions in the engine fuel lines. The No. 5 fuel injector nozzle contained a trace amount of debris that did not inhibit the flow opening, and all other fuel injector nozzles were clear. The engine-driven fuel pump was operationally tested with no anomalies noted.  
The fuel selector handle, fuel selector valve/fuel strainer, and fuel selector torque tube displayed thermal damage. The torque tube was slightly bent. The fuel selector valve was found between the off and left main tank positions. The ports inside the fuel selector valve were not open in the setting as found on-site. The fuel selector valve/fuel strainer was opened, revealing significant carbon and fire damage. The fuel servo, model number RSA-10ED1, was retained and sent to the manufacturer for examination and testing under the observation of the NTSB. During the testing, it operated slightly lean at higher power settings, but was within limits and there were no anomalies or unusual findings discovered during the subsequent teardown inspection.
The left wing was mostly consumed by impact and fire. The left wing aileron bellcrank was burned away from the mounting location in the wing. The aileron control cables remained attached to the bellcrank. The aileron balance cable was separated mid-cabin and exhibited features consistent with overstress. Aileron cable separations not attributed to recovery cuts revealed overload signatures and fire damage. The right wing remained attached to the airframe and upright. There were about 5 gallons of fuel in the right tank, and the tank was leaking at the wing root. The fuel was tested for contaminants with negative results. The flaps were in the 10° position and the landing gear was in the up/retracted position. 
Aileron control continuity was confirmed for both wings through flight control cables to the cockpit. The empennage was separated from the airframe and was held in place by the control cables. The pitch trim actuator was consistent with a nose-down pitch attitude. The rudder, stabilator, and stabilator trim control continuity were confirmed. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONThe NTSB received a video file recorded by a camera at a private residence about 1,800 ft from the accident site. The video featured a timestamp overlay.
The audio was recorded at a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz. The camera was oriented southwest, capturing footage during nighttime conditions. The engine was first audible at 1941:00, with the airplane lights becoming visible at 1941:29, moving from right to left across the screen. At 1941:37, the engine sound became abnormal, and the audio contained several “popping” noises at this time. By 1942:10, the airplane began a descending left turn, followed by a descending right turn toward the east about 1942:50. The airplane was no longer visible after 1943:19. A flash of light, corresponding to the airplane impact and post-impact fire, was observed at 1943:28. The video concluded at 1943:36.
For this type of reciprocating engine, the noise generated by the propeller is strongest at the fundamental blade passage frequency (BPF), which is related to engine rpm. The sound captured was analyzed to estimate the operating speed of the airplane’s engine and/or propeller during the final moments of the flight. The calculated rpm was about 2,650 shortly before the engine ceased operation about two minutes before the airplane impacted terrain. After popping noises were audible and the pilot reported to the controller that the engine had shut down, no BPF lines were observed after this point, and an rpm calculation could not be made. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONAn autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Center for Forensic Medicine, Office of the Medical Examiner, Nashville, Tennessee. The autopsy report was reviewed by the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was combined blunt force trauma and thermal injuries, and the manor of death was accident caused by airplane crash with fire.
Toxicology testing performed at NMS Labs in Horsham, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Nashville, Tennessee, Medical examiner indicated no positive findings. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no evidence of carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs of abuse.