CIRRUS SR22

Full Narrative

On October 11, 2023, about 2247 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR-22 airplane, N253BC, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Martinsville, Virginia. The pilot and three passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to the pilot, he refueled the airplane, completed a preflight inspection, updated the airplane’s electronic flight instrument system, and departed Blue Ridge Airport (MTV), Martinsville, Virginia, for a night, visual flight rules, cross-country flight to Oklahoma. The pilot reported that on takeoff, after he established a positive rate of climb at an airspeed of 95 kts, he retracted the flaps, which had been set to 50%. Shortly thereafter, he reported that the PFD “blinked off” momentarily and then reappeared with a “Taxiway! Taxiway!” banner. He looked at the MFD and noted that it was “completely orange” and appeared to depict an autopilot track turning directly left, which he found confusing and made him wonder if the autopilot was engaged. The pilot further reported that it was “an extremely dark evening” and he “just happened to look up” and saw that the airplane was flying directly toward a large pine tree. He attempted to avoid the tree; however, the airplane struck trees to the left of and about 1.1 miles away from the departure end of the runway.
The pilot was able to maintain control of the airplane, and the engine was developing full power as the airplane continued to climb to the traffic pattern altitude. The pilot stated that the airplane was “very shaky,” and that he was unable to see the altitude on the primary flight display. He was not certain if the autopilot was engaged, so he repeatedly pressed the autopilot disconnect button. He circled back toward MTV, trimmed the airplane for landing, and made a safe landing on runway 13, after which he immediately cleared the runway and shut off the engine.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and the windscreen during the accident sequence. Examination of the pitot tube revealed that its inlet was obstructed by material consistent with the impacted trees.
The airplane was equipped with two Garmin GDU 1250A 12-inch displays. One display, the PFD, was installed directly in front of the left (pilot’s) seat, and the second unit, the MFD, was installed above the center console. The PFD was intended to be the primary display of flight parameter information (including attitude, airspeed, heading, and altitude) during normal operations. The PFD accepted data from a variety of sources, including the MFD and the Integrated Avionics Units, through a high-speed data bus connection. In conjunction with a Flight Management System Keyboard, the PFD also controlled and displays all communication and navigation frequencies and displayed warning/status annunciations for airplane’s systems. The MFD depicted navigation, terrain, engine, and traffic data, navigation and communication frequencies, and annunciation information.
The avionics platform allowed for loading updated databases into the system. The updates were loaded onto the airplane using the MFD or PFD card slots and inserting an SD card with the update(s) into the slot. The procedure for loading databases into the avionics platform is provided in the Cirrus Cockpit Reference Guide for the SR20/SR22/SR22T.
During postaccident interviews, the pilot indicated that he updated the airplane’s databases the morning of the accident but had to reload them because they did not load correctly during the first attempt. An examination of both GDUs revealed that several of the databases were missing; however, according to the airframe manufacturer, the database status was normal for the particular airplane and avionics system.
The airplane’s display system for the PFD and MFD had a display backup mode. According to the Cirrus SR22T Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH):
In the event of a detected display failure, the Integrated Avionics System automatically switches to Display Backup Mode. In Display Backup Mode, all essential flight information from the PFD is presented on the remaining display in the same format as in normal operating mode with the addition of the Engine Indicating System. The change to backup is completely automated and no pilot action is required. However, if the system fails to detect a display problem, Display Backup Mode may be manually activated by pressing the red DISPLAY BACKUP Button. Pressing this button again deactivates Display Backup Mode.
The airplane was equipped with standby instruments for airspeed, attitude, and altitude, powered independently of the PFD and MFD, and located just below the PFD. In the case of a primary instrument failure, the standby instruments were available to the pilot. After the accident, the PFD, MFD, and standby instruments were powered up, and all displays operated normally.
The Garmin system was capable of recording flight and engine data on an SD card installed in the MFD. The airframe manufacturer extracted SD card data from the accident airplane and provided it to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination. The SD card contained the accident flight recording and was about 12 minutes long. The data recorded did not indicate that there was any interruption in electrical power during the flight.
The airplane was also equipped with an Appareo RDM-300 digital flight data recorder, which recorded all parameters recorded by the Garmin G1000 as well as additional airplane parameters. The data revealed that for takeoff, flaps were set at 50%, in accordance with the airplane’s POH. Full power was applied, the airplane began its takeoff roll about 2246:14, and it reached rotation speed (77 kts) at 2246:29. The airplane began its initial climb, and at 2246:48, at an altitude of 1,100 ft, the flaps retracted. The airplane continued to climb for about 8 seconds, reaching an altitude of 1,134 ft, after which it began to descend, despite the engine being at full power. The descent continued for about 15 seconds, and the descent rate increased to a maximum of 736 ft per minute. While in the descent, the airspeed increased from 110 to 137 kts. During the descent, at 2247:11, the autopilot system was engaged. At 2247:12, at an altitude of 1,031 ft, the indicated airspeed decreased to 0 kts, consistent with tree impact damage to the pitot tube. This was immediately followed by a vertical speed increase, and the airplane began to climb again, reaching a maximum altitude of 2,270 ft. The indicated airspeed remained between 0 and 43 kts for the remainder of the recording. At 2249:32, the autopilot system was disengaged. Except for the indicated airspeed, the data indicated no malfunctions of the airplane for the remainder of the return to the departure airport.
The airplane’s avionics system was capable of recording the gross weight of the airplane by using the empty weight of the airplane and values entered by the pilot for fuel onboard and weights of the passengers and baggage. According to the recorded data, the airplane had a gross weight of 3,782.5 lbs at takeoff. The maximum takeoff weight indicated in the Cirrus SR22T POH was 3600 lbs. According to the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA publication FAA-H-8083-25C:
The takeoff/climb and landing performance of an aircraft are determined on the basis of its maximum allowable takeoff and landing weights. A heavier gross weight results in a longer takeoff run and shallower climb, and a faster touchdown speed and longer landing roll. Even a minor overload may make it impossible for the aircraft to clear an obstacle that normally would not be a problem during takeoff under more favorable conditions.
The avionics system was equipped with the Garmin SurfaceWatch feature, which was capable of providing visual and aural annunciations to help prevent potential runway incursions or excursions during ground and air operations in the airport environment. Two of the alerts for the SurfaceWatch system were the taxiway takeoff and taxiway landing warnings. These warnings would provide a voice alert of “Taxiway” and a visual annunciation of “TWY TAKEOFF” or “TWY LANDING,” respectively. These warnings were provided when the system detected that the airplane was taking off from or landing on a non-runway.
According to the Cirrus Perspective+ Pilot’s Guide, the avionics system was capable of providing a Negative Climb Rate After Takeoff alert. During the accident flight, the airplane was operated within the performance envelope that would trigger a “Too Low, Terrain” caution message, which would also illuminate the terrain amber on the display. However, the G1000 only recorded terrain warnings, not cautions, and no terrain warnings were recorded during this flight.
The Takeoff Minimums, (Obstacle) Departure Procedures, and Diverse Vector Area (Radar Vectors) section of the FAA Chart Supplement provided specific guidance regarding takeoff minimums and obstacles for MTV. For departures from runway 31, the supplement stated that it is necessary to have a minimum climb rate of 321 ft per nautical mile. It noted specific obstacles when departing runway 31, including trees that began 82 ft from the departure end of the runway and were 9 ft right of the runway’s extended centerline, up to 100 ft above ground level (agl) (1,058 ft mean sea level [msl]). The supplement also reported trees beginning 102 ft from the departure end of the runway that were 94 ft left of the extended runway centerline, up to 77 ft agl (1,047 ft msl).