CESSNA P210

Full Narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 10, 2023, at 1005 eastern daylight time, a Cessna P210N, N210JT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Junction City, Georgia. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to the pilot’s wife, the purpose of the trip was to return from Florida to their home in Georgia. She also reported that the pilot did not have any activities scheduled for the day and had set aside the day. The pilot typically made the flight about once a month.

The pilot had filed an IFR flight plan using the ForeFlight application the morning of the accident flight and received an IFR clearance to the destination by ATC. A review of ADS-B data and FAA air traffic control communications revealed that the airplane departed Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota/Bradenton, Florida, at 0800 with a destination of Thomaston-Upson County Airport (OPN), Thomaston, Georgia. The flight climbed to a cruising altitude of FL200 and at 0948 an ARTCC controller advised the pilot of weather along the route of flight. At 0951 the pilot requested deviations for weather; ATC granted the request and instructed the pilot to descent to 11,000 ft.

At 0954 Atlanta ARTCC contacted the Macon sector of Atlanta approach control and coordinated the accident airplane’s deviations to the left for weather. At 0958 the pilot was instructed to contact Atlanta approach, which he did, advising them, “with you descending to one one thousand.” The controller acknowledged the pilot and instructed him to descend to 8,000 ft, which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then asked the pilot at 0959 to, “advise approach request and the weather at Upson County.” The pilot responded that he would like the RNAV 30 approach with the initial approach fix of SINFO; the controller then asked if the pilot could proceed direct to SINFO. The pilot responded saying, “in about a couple of minutes I just want to get around this buildup on my right-hand side.” The controller then instructed the pilot, “when able fly heading 0-8-0 vectors for RNAV 30,” which the pilot acknowledged.

At 1001 Atlanta approach called the pilot and stated, “I don’t know what you’re missing on your right but I know that the one you’re going into is the one I see and it looks pretty bad at your 2 o’clock 5 miles 20 miles in diameter heavy to extreme precipitation uh unless you plan on doing a left turn out to 0-8-0 I’d advise starting your turn at this time.” The pilot responded, “…I’ll start my turn;” this was the last transmission by the pilot. After this exchange, the pilot made a slight right turn from a heading of 322° to about 340°, which he maintained until 1004:28 when a right turn began with the airplane about 11,925 ft above ground level (agl). The right turn continued, tightened, and a rapid descent began with the last track data point at 1005:04 when the airplane was about 6,200 ft agl. The last track data point was about 1,590 ft west northwest of the accident site. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. He reported a total of 1,870 flight hours on his most recent application for an FAA-issued medical certificate, dated December 6, 2022. No pilot logbooks were found, and the investigation was unable to determine the pilot’s instrument currency or total amount of flight time in actual instrument meteorological conditions. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was equipped with a Garmin GWX 68 radar antenna that was interfaced with a Garmin GTN 750 Xi multifunction display, and a Garmin GI 275 electronic flight instrument. The GWX 68 was installed on August 23, 2022. According to the manufacturer, the GWX 68 was a compact all-in-one antenna/receiver/transmitter that provided 4-color storm cell tracking. Due to the disposition of the wreckage and thermal damage, the investigation was not able to determine if the GWX 68 was operational or being used at the time of the accident.
The airplane was also equipped with an L3 WX-500 Stormscope. According to the manufacturer, the antenna detected the electric and magnetic fields generated by intra-cloud, inter-cloud, or cloud-to-ground electrical discharges that occured within a 200 nautical mile radius of the aircraft and sent the resulting "discharge signals" to the processor. The processor digitized, analyzed, and convertd the discharge signals into range and bearing data. The processor then communicated that information to the external display as cells and strikes. Due to the disposition of the wreckage and thermal damage, the investigation was not able to determine if the WX-500 was operational or being used at the time of the accident. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAccording to Leidos Flight Services (LFS), neither LFS nor any third- party vendor using the LFS system had any contact with the pilot of the accident airplane on the accident day or the day before. According to data provided by ForeFlight, the accident pilot did not receive weather information from ForeFlight on the accident day or the day before .

Weather surveillance radar data showed light to extreme values of reflectivity along or near the accident airplane’s flight path about the time of the accident.Visible and infrared satellite data showed that the cloud tops in the vicinity of the accident site corresponded to about 21,000 ft. The 1015 automated weather observation station report at Butler Municipal Airport (6A1), Butler, Georgia, which was located about 10 miles southeast of the accident site, reported an overcast ceiling at 1,900 ft above ground level.

The closest National Weather Service (NWS) Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) site to the accident location was Columbus Airport (CSG) in Columbus, Georgia, which was located about 29 miles west-southwest of the accident site. At 0850, a TAF was issued for CSG that forecasted for the accident time: a wind from 260° at 5 knots, visibility greater than 6 statute miles, rain showers in the vicinity and ceiling overcast at 1,500 feet agl; temporary conditions between 0900 and 1100 of a variable wind at 15 knots with gusts to 30 knots, visibility of 4 statute miles, thunderstorm with moderate rain, and an overcast ceiling at 1,200 feet agl with cumulonimbus clouds.

At 0955, the NWS’ Aviation Weather Center issued Convective SIGMET 42E that was active for the accident location and valid until 1155. It warned of an area of thunderstorms with tops to FL450. The Convective SIGMET’s polygon was moving from 270° at 40 knots. Convective SIGMETs implied severe or greater turbulence, severe icing, and low-level wind shear.

The Graphical Forecasts for Aviation (GFA) imagery depicted broken and overcast sky conditions in the immediate accident region, with the data point nearest the accident location identifying cloud bases at 1,400 feet and tops at FL220. The GFA surface forecasts also depicted scattered thunderstorms near the accident location with visibilities greater than 5 statute miles and surface winds gusting up to 20 knots. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was equipped with a Garmin GWX 68 radar antenna that was interfaced with a Garmin GTN 750 Xi multifunction display, and a Garmin GI 275 electronic flight instrument. The GWX 68 was installed on August 23, 2022. According to the manufacturer, the GWX 68 was a compact all-in-one antenna/receiver/transmitter that provided 4-color storm cell tracking. Due to the disposition of the wreckage and thermal damage, the investigation was not able to determine if the GWX 68 was operational or being used at the time of the accident.
The airplane was also equipped with an L3 WX-500 Stormscope. According to the manufacturer, the antenna detected the electric and magnetic fields generated by intra-cloud, inter-cloud, or cloud-to-ground electrical discharges that occured within a 200 nautical mile radius of the aircraft and sent the resulting "discharge signals" to the processor. The processor digitized, analyzed, and convertd the discharge signals into range and bearing data. The processor then communicated that information to the external display as cells and strikes. Due to the disposition of the wreckage and thermal damage, the investigation was not able to determine if the WX-500 was operational or being used at the time of the accident. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe main wreckage of the airplane came to rest in a heavily wooded area at an elevation of about 575 ft mean sea level, and oriented on a heading of about 179°. There were multiple trees that exhibited impact damage from the airplane consistent with a near-vertical descent and impact. The final tree impact was co-located with the remaining tail section of the wreckage and the top of the tree was fractured about 40 ft from the base.

A majority of the fuselage, including the instrument panel, was consumed by postimpact fire. The horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and elevator trim separated from the airplane in flight and were not recovered while on site. A portion of the horizontal stabilizer was found after completion of the onsite examination about 0.59 nautical miles (nm) southeast of the accident site. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were separated just above the middle rudder hinge and the separated portions were not recovered while on site. The aft spar of the vertical stabilizer and the remainder of the vertical stabilizer and rudder remained attached to the tail. A portion of the vertical stabilizer was located after completion of the onsite examination about 0.62 nm southeast of the accident site. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage and was located at the accident site with the aileron, flap, and speed brake attached. The left wing was not recovered during the onsite examination and a portion was later located about 0.58 nm southeast of the accident site with the flap and speed brake attached. All fracture surfaces were consistent with overload failure.

Elevator control continuity was established from the elevator bellcrank in the tail to the control in the cockpit through cuts made to facilitate recovery. Rudder control continuity was confirmed from the rudder bellcrank to the rudder pedals in the cockpit through cuts made to facilitate recovery. Right aileron continuity was confirmed from the control surface to an overload fracture in the forward cabin door post; the cable exhibited broom straw and unraveling. The left aileron direct control cable exhibited an overload fracture and broom straw at the forward door post and was continuous into the cabin. The aileron balance cable was continuous from the right aileron bellcrank to the stop that would normally attach to the left aileron bellcrank.

The engine was examined and no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded normal operation. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
At the time of the accident the Macon Sector Radar (MCN-M) position was manned by an on-the-job training instructor (OJTI) and trainee. Both the OJTI and trainee were current and proficient in accordance with the facility standards on the day of the accident. The MCN-M controller trainee had been training with the MCN-M OJTI controller on the MCN-M position for approximately 29 minutes before the accident. According to postaccident interviews, both the MCN-M trainee and OJTI controller stated that they regularly trained together and the MCN-M OJTI controller was assigned as a permanent member of the MCN-M trainee controller’s training team. The MCN-M OJTI controller stated that they felt that the training pairing worked well. The MCN-M controller trainee stated that they had a great relationship with the two trainers that were assigned to the training team. Additionally, it was stated that they had discussed together options available to guide the accident pilot around the depicted weather.
The OJTI and trainee reported during their respective interviews that the pilot was issued the initial 0-8-0 heading by the trainee for both weather avoidance and for sequencing into OPN. The OJTI continued that he made the transmission to the pilot at 1001 with the weather advisory and suggestion, once again, to make the turn to 0-8-0 “at this time” and that, based upon the airplane’s ground speed, he would expect the airplane to begin that turn within about 2 miles.
Up to and including the time of the accident, the facility was actively soliciting pilot weather reports. These reports included information detailing turbulence encounters, low ceilings, and precipitation. More detailed information is included in the Meteorology Specialist’s Factual Report.
FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, Air Traffic Control, Chapter 2, section 6, paragraph 2-6-4a, Issuing Weather and Chaff Areas, provided procedures and guidance for controllers in prioritizing their duties and stated in part:
a. Controllers must issue pertinent information on observed/reported weather and chaff areas to potentially affected aircraft. Define the area of coverage in terms of:
1. Azimuth (by referring to the 12-hour clock) and distance from the aircraft and/or

2. The general width of the area and the area of coverage in terms of fixes or distance and direction from fixes.

NOTE- Weather significant to the safety of aircraft includes conditions such as funnel cloud activity, lines of thunderstorms, embedded thunderstorms, large hail, wind shear, microbursts, moderate to extreme turbulence (including CAT), and light to severe icing.
PHRASEOLOGY- WEATHER/CHAFF AREA BETWEEN (number) O’CLOCK AND (number) O’CLOCK (number) MILES, and/or (number) MILE BAND OF WEATHER/CHAFF FROM (fix or number of miles and direction from fix) TO (fix or number of miles and direction from fix).
b. Inform any tower for which you provide approach control services of observed precipitation on radar which is likely to affect their operations.
c. Use the term “precipitation” when describing radar-derived weather. Issue the precipitation intensity from the lowest descriptor (LIGHT) to the highest descriptor (EXTREME) when that information is available. Do not use the word “turbulence” in describing radar-derived weather.
1. LIGHT.
2. MODERATE.
3. HEAVY.
4. EXTREME.
PHRASEOLOGY- AREA OF (Intensity) PRECIPITATION BETWEEN (number) O’CLOCK AND (number) O’CLOCK, (number) MILES, MOVING (direction) AT (number) KNOTS, TOPS (altitude). AREA IS (number) MILES IN DIAMETER. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Division of Forensic Sciences, ruled the cause of death for the pilot as “Multiple blunt force injuries” and the manner of death as “Undetermined.”
The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the pilot. No tested-for substances were detected.