EMBRAER EMB 145XR
Newark, NJ — April 24, 2014
Event Information
| Date | April 24, 2014 |
| Event Type | INC |
| NTSB Number | OPS14IA005 |
| Event ID | 20140425X84104 |
| Location | Newark, NJ |
| Country | USA |
| Coordinates | 40.70139, -74.15916 |
| Airport | NEWARK LIBERTY INTL |
| Highest Injury | — |
Aircraft
| Make | EMBRAER |
| Model | EMB 145XR |
| Category | AIR |
| FAR Part | 121 |
Conditions
| Light Condition | DAYL |
| Weather | VMC |
Injuries
| Fatal | 0 |
| Serious | 0 |
| Minor | 0 |
| None | 0 |
| Total Injured | 0 |
Event Location
Probable Cause
The local controller’s failure to comply with Federal Aviation Administration separation requirements for aircraft operating on intersecting runways.
Full Narrative
On Thursday, April 24, 2014, about 1503 eastern daylight time, a near midair collision occurred at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, when an ExpressJet flight 4100 (ASQ4100), an Embraer ERJ145 departing EWR runway 4R for Memphis, Tennessee, passed in close proximity to United Airlines flight 1243 (UAL1243), a Boeing 737-800 arriving from San Francisco, California and intending to land on runway 29. Both aircraft were on regularly scheduled 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 passenger flights and under control of EWR airport traffic control tower (ATCT) at the time of the incident. There was no damage reported to either aircraft, or any injuries to passengers or crew.
At 1457:15, the pilot of UAL1243 contacted EWR ATCT and reported that he was on the Bridge visual approach to runway 29. The local controller informed the pilot that he was following a B717 (Delta Airlines flight 1942, DAL1942) and cleared the flight to land on runway 29.
About 1459, the local controller requested DAL1942 to shorten up his approach to runway 29, and subsequently instructed UAL1243 to fly a normal to slightly wider procedure because he was "starting to bunch up with the 717." Both pilots acknowledged the instructions.
According to the local controller, in order to create space for departures off runway 4R, he had to adjust the pattern for each arrival to build a departure gap. He had some of the arrivals make a short approach to runway 29, and some make a wider approach so he could build in an extra mile of spacing.
At 1500:22, the local controller instructed ASQ4100 to line up and wait (LUAW) on runway 4R. Twenty seconds later the local controller advised the pilot of UAL1243 that he could turn back toward final. The pilots acknowledged the instructions.
At 1501:20, the local controller informed the pilot of ASQ4100 to "be ready in about 20 seconds, up on the power." The pilot acknowledged. According to radar data, DAL1942 was approximately 1.2 miles from the threshold of runway 29, and UAL1243 was approximately 3.5 miles east-southeast of the airport flying a modified Bridge visual approach.
At 1501:44, the local controller cleared ASQ4100 for takeoff from runway 4R. According to radar data, DAL1942 was approximately 0.35 mile from the threshold of runway 29, and UAL1243 was approximately 3.1 miles from the runway 29 threshold.
At 1502:40, the local controller directed UAL1243 to "go around," and informed the pilot that departing traffic was to his left. The pilot acknowledged and began to execute a missed approach. According to radar data, UAL1243 was approximately .85 mile from the threshold of runway 29 and at 200 feet when the local controller issued the go-around instruction.
At 1502:49, the local controller advised the pilot of ASQ4100, "traffic off your right, do you have him in sight, maintain visual." Six seconds later the pilot responded, "yeah, we put the nose down, yeah he was real close." After ASQ4100 had crossed under UAL1243, the local controller instructed the pilot to resume the standard instrument departure procedure (SID) and contact departure. The pilot responded, "contact departure, yeah, he was real close sir."
The local controller issued UAL1243 the missed approach instructions for runway 29 and instructed the pilot to contact departure control . The remainder of the flight was uneventful. UAL1243 landed on EWR runway 29 about 1514.
Radar data indicated the closest lateral and vertical proximity was approximately 0.03 mile and 400 feet.
For further information, see the air traffic control group chairman's report in the docket for this case.
On Thursday, April 24, 2014, about 1503 eastern daylight time, a near midair collision occurred at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, when an ExpressJet flight 4100 (ASQ4100), an Embraer ERJ145 departing EWR runway 4R for Memphis, Tennessee, passed in close proximity to United Airlines flight 1243 (UAL1243), a Boeing 737-800 arriving from San Francisco, California and intending to land on runway 29. Both aircraft were on regularly scheduled 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 passenger flights and under control of EWR airport traffic control tower (ATCT) at the time of the incident. There was no damage reported to either aircraft, or any injuries to passengers or crew.
At 1457:15, the pilot of UAL1243 contacted EWR ATCT and reported that he was on the Bridge visual approach to runway 29. The local controller informed the pilot that he was following a B717 (Delta Airlines flight 1942, DAL1942) and cleared the flight to land on runway 29.
About 1459, the local controller requested DAL1942 to shorten up his approach to runway 29, and subsequently instructed UAL1243 to fly a normal to slightly wider procedure because he was "starting to bunch up with the 717." Both pilots acknowledged the instructions.
According to the local controller, in order to create space for departures off runway 4R, he had to adjust the pattern for each arrival to build a departure gap. He had some of the arrivals make a short approach to runway 29, and some make a wider approach so he could build in an extra mile of spacing.
At 1500:22, the local controller instructed ASQ4100 to line up and wait (LUAW) on runway 4R. Twenty seconds later the local controller advised the pilot of UAL1243 that he could turn back toward final. The pilots acknowledged the instructions.
At 1501:20, the local controller informed the pilot of ASQ4100 to "be ready in about 20 seconds, up on the power." The pilot acknowledged. According to radar data, DAL1942 was approximately 1.2 miles from the threshold of runway 29, and UAL1243 was approximately 3.5 miles east-southeast of the airport flying a modified Bridge visual approach.
At 1501:44, the local controller cleared ASQ4100 for takeoff from runway 4R. According to radar data, DAL1942 was approximately 0.35 mile from the threshold of runway 29, and UAL1243 was approximately 3.1 miles from the runway 29 threshold.
At 1502:40, the local controller directed UAL1243 to "go around," and informed the pilot that departing traffic was to his left. The pilot acknowledged and began to execute a missed approach. According to radar data, UAL1243 was approximately .85 mile from the threshold of runway 29 and at 200 feet when the local controller issued the go-around instruction.
At 1502:49, the local controller advised the pilot of ASQ4100, "traffic off your right, do you have him in sight, maintain visual." Six seconds later the pilot responded, "yeah, we put the nose down, yeah he was real close." After ASQ4100 had crossed under UAL1243, the local controller instructed the pilot to resume the standard instrument departure procedure (SID) and contact departure. The pilot responded, "contact departure, yeah, he was real close sir."
The local controller issued UAL1243 the missed approach instructions for runway 29 and instructed the pilot to contact departure control . The remainder of the flight was uneventful. UAL1243 landed on EWR runway 29 about 1514.
Radar data indicated the closest lateral and vertical proximity was approximately 0.03 mile and 400 feet.
For further information, see the air traffic control group chairman's report in the docket for this case.
About This NTSB Record
This aviation event was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). NTSB investigates all U.S. civil aviation accidents to determine probable cause and issue safety recommendations to prevent future accidents.