BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP

Incident Narrative

ON JANUARY 16, 2018, AT APPROXIMATELY 16:50, ALL THE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES (MOVS) AND EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN DEVICES (ESDS) IN THE 5000 AREA (LPG) CLOSED. AT APPROXIMATELY 16:51, THE SUPPLIER WAS NOTIFIED TO STOP FLOW AND BUCKEYE PERSONNEL WERE DISPATCHED TO THE 5000 AREA TO INVESTIGATE THE ISSUE. AT APPROXIMATELY 16:59, BUCKEYE PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT A PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (PRV) ON A COALESCER WAS CONTINUOUSLY VENTING TO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE SET PRESSURE OF THE PRV WAS RELEASING AT THE INTENDED PRESSURE OF 275 PSIG. OVER A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES, BUCKEYE PERSONNEL INTERMITTENTLY ISOLATED THE PRV FROM THE COALESCER IN AN ATTEMPT TO RE-SEAT THE DEVICE BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AT THIS TIME, THE PRV WAS ALLOWED TO VENT TO THE ATMOSPHERE. AT 17:30, A CONTRACTOR WAS CALLED TO ASSIST WITH THE PRV. AT 18:11, THE CONTRACTOR ISOLATED THE PRV FROM THE SYSTEM AND THE RELEASE OF PROPANE TO THE ATMOSPHERE WAS COMPLETELY STOPPED. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MASTER CONTROL CENTER (MCC) WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH AN ESD IN THE 5000 AREA BECAME LOOSE WHICH IN TURN CAUSED ALL MOVS AND ESDS IN THE CORRESPONDING AREA TO FAIL CLOSED, WHICH IS THE ENGINEERED FAIL SAFE POSITION. THE ACTIVATION OF THE PRV WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE SUPPLIER'S FEED TEMPORARILY BYPASSING BUCKEYE'S ESD VIA A TRV FOR THE DURATION OF TIME THAT IT TOOK TO CONTACT THE SUPPLIER AND NOTIFY THEM OF THE CLOSURE OF OUR MOVS AND ESDS. DURING THIS TIME THE PIPELINE SYSTEM REACHED THE SET PRESSURE OF THE PRV, 275 PSIG. AS THE PIPELINE SYSTEM REACHED 275 PSIG THE COALESCER PRV ACTIVATED AND THE AUTO REFRIGERATION OF PROPANE RESULTED IN THE FORMATION OF ICE WITHIN THE PRV. THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE ACHIEVED BY THE SYSTEM WAS VERIFIED AS 286 PSIG, WHICH IS LOWER THAN THE ESTABLISHED MOP OF 340 PSIG. BUCKEYE CONCLUDED THAT THE WIRING WAS NOT ADEQUATELY TIGHTENED DURING INSTALLATION AND THE LOOSE WIRING WAS SIMPLY TIGHTENED AND SECURED PROPERLY. AS AN ADDED PREVENTATIVE MEASURE, BUCKEYE MODIFIED THE EXISTING CONTROL CENTER PERMISSIVES TO INCLUDE LOGIC IN THE PLC THAT WILL CLOSE THE FURTHEST UPSTREAM MAINLINE VALVE OF THE FACILITY PIPING IF ANY FACILITY ESDS GO INTO A CLOSED STATUS. THIS WILL STOP THE SUPPLIER'S FEED INTO THE FACILITY IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SITUATION AND ENSURE THAT THE FACILITY'S PRVS WILL NOT CONTINUOUSLY VENT TO THE ATMOSPHERE.