Complaint Statistics
3 total complaints
Top Reported Components
| Component | Complaints |
|---|
| UNKNOWN OR OTHER | 1 |
| SERVICE BRAKES | 1 |
| FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL | 1 |
Incident date: Oct 27, 2025
Car will just brake on the highway with out warning. Cruise control will just randomly change speeds. I was traveling on an overpass and speed dropped to 35 then jumped to 60mph.
Incident date: Oct 27, 2025
Car will just brake on the highway with out warning. Cruise control will just randomly change speeds. I was traveling on an overpass and speed dropped to 35 then jumped to 60mph.
Incident date: Oct 10, 2025
I was using Full Self-Driving (FSD) Supervised capability. We were turning left and the car took us into an oncoming turn lane. I had to take over to get us out of the lane.
EPA Fuel Economy — 2026 TESLA MODEL S
| Trim / Engine |
City MPG |
Highway MPG |
Combined MPG |
Fuel Type |
Annual Fuel Cost |
|
Automatic (A1) (All-Wheel Drive) |
132.0 |
116.0 |
124.0 |
Electricity |
$600 |
CO2 Emissions: 0.0 g/mile (Large Cars)
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Actual fuel economy may vary based on driving conditions.
NHTSA Safety Investigations — TESLA MODEL S
Investigations opened by NHTSA into potential safety defects. These are separate from recalls and may or may not result in a recall.
PE — Closed
— Model Year: 2022
Crash incidents during Actually Smart Summon sessions
Smart Summon and Actually Smart Summon are features on certain Tesla vehicles that allow a user to remotely move the vehicle to the user or to another designated location, through use of a phone app. The Oï¬ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 1 complaint (VOQ) alleging that an Actuall
... y Smart Summon session resulted in a crash and has reviewed at least 3 media reports of apparently similar crashes. All four incidents involve the subject Tesla vehicles operating in Actually Smart Summon failing to detect posts or parked vehicles, resulting in a crash. Actually Smart Summon replaced Smart Summon and provided users with extended vehicle operating range while expanding vehicle connectivity through phone app live camera feeds and increased user latency experience. ODI has received 12 Smart Summon related VOQs alleging crash typology similar to the crashes experienced by users of Actually Smart Summon during sessions with little time for operators to react. ODI is aware of multiple crash allegations, involving both Smart Summon and Actually Smart Summon, where the user had too little reaction time to avoid a crash, either with the available line of sight or releasing the phone app button, which stops the vehicleâs movement. Tesla has not reported any Smart Summon or Actually Smart Summon crashes through the Standing General Order for crashes involving ADS or Level 2 ADAS, which requires reporting of crashes on publicly accessible roads. ODI is opening this preliminary evaluation to investigate Actually Smart Summonâs capabilities as they relate to the subject and similar crashes, including the system's operation and ï¬eld performance in FSD equipped vehicles and vehicles included in free trial offers. NHTSA will evaluate the top speed that a vehicle can attain while Actually Smart Summon is engaged, designed-in operating restrictions for usage on public roads, and line of sight requirements. NHTSA expects this preliminary evaluation to include review of remote vehicle control through the phone app at various distances and lines of sight, including app connectivity delays resulting in increased stopping distance and the ability to utilize Actually Smart Summon in roadway environments or operating conditions for which the current version of the system is neither intended nor designed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identiï¬cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.Read more
RQ — Open
— Model Year: 2022
Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla
... described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Teslaâs Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Teslaâs Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that âthe prominence and scope of the systemâs controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,â and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Teslaâs Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Teslaâs conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODIâs concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.Read more
DP — Closed
— Model Year: 2014
Defect Petition Interlock Request
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a ârecall of all Tesla carsâ produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the P
... etition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driverâs foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Teslaâs response to ODIâs Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitionerâs proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.Read more
PE — Closed
— Model Year: 2017
Fore Link Failure
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation based on forty-three complaints alleging failure of the left or right front suspension fore links in Tesla model year (MY) 2015 through 2017 Model S and MY 2016 through 2017 Model X vehicles. The investigation has identifie
... d 426 instances of failure on part number 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links.None of the instances resulted in any loss of vehicle control. One minor crash with no injuries is associated with the 426 instances fore link failures.A majority of the failures occurred between one to fifteen mph while parking in driveways or parking lots.In the eight instances where the vehicle was traveling more than 40 mph and the fore link failed, the vehicle remained controllable with no associated crash or injuries as a result. Tesla issued a consumer satisfaction bulletin (SB-17-31-001) on 10 February 2017, to replace the subject component on a sub-population of vehicles originally equipped with the subject fore links and built between 19 January 2016 and 25 May 2016.This sub population does not cover 75% instances of failures identified in this investigation. Additional damage to other vehicle components will occur if the vehicle is driven with this failed fore link.However no instance has shown that a failure of the fore link in this manner prevented the controllability of the vehicle in testing and reported failures. Based on this analysis,ODI is closing the investigation. ODI recommends that Tesla expand the terms of Bulletin SB-17-31-001 to cover all vehicles equipped with 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links. This does not constitute a finding by the Agency that a safety-related defect is not present; the Agency will take further action if warranted by additional information received. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.Read more
PE — Closed
— Model Year: 2014
Automatic vehicle control systems
On May 7, 2016, a 2015 Tesla Model S collided with a tractor trailer crossing an uncontrolled intersection on a highway west of Williston, Florida, resulting in fatal injuries to the Tesla driver.Data obtained from the Model S indicated that:1) the Tesla was being operated in Autopilot mode at the t
... ime of the collision; 2) the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system did not provide any warning or automated braking for the collision event; and 3) the driver took no braking, steering or other actions to avoid the collision.On June 28, 2016, NHTSA opened PE16-007 to ?examine the design and performance of any automated driving systems in use at the time of the crash.?The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) analyzed the following subjects as part of NHTSA?s examination of the design and performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system:1) Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system design and performance in the subject Tesla and peer vehicles; 2) human-machine interface issues related to Autopilot operating mode; 3) data from crash incidents related to Tesla?s Autopilot and AEB systems; and 4) changes Tesla has implemented in the Autopilot and AEB systems.NHTSA?s examination did not identify any defects in the design or performance of the AEB or Autopilotsystems of the subject vehicles nor any incidents in which the systems did not perform as designed.AEB systems used in the automotive industry through MY 2016 are rear-end collision avoidance technologies that are not designed to reliably perform in all crash modes, including crossing path collisions.The Autopilot system is an Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) that requires the continual and full attention of the driver to monitor the traffic environment and be prepared to take action to avoid crashes.Tesla's design included a hands-on the steering wheel system for monitoring driver engagement.That system has been updated to further reinforce the need for driver engagement through a strike out strategy.Drivers that do not respond to visual cues in the driver monitoring system alerts may strike out and lose Autopilot function for the remainder of the drive cycle.A safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time and further examination of this issue does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, this investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists.The agency will monitor the issue and reserves the right to take future action if warranted by the circumstances.For more information about the analysis, see the attached report.Read more
PE — Closed
— Model Year: 2013
Fire - Propulsion Battery - Road Debris
The subject vehicles (SV), model years 2012-2013 Tesla Model S, are emerging technology electric vehicles using a high voltage battery (HVB) to provide propulsion energy. The HVB uses lithium-ion cells combined in 60 or 85 kWh capacities, and a control system that monitors the HVB and its liquid coo
... ling system. The HVB is positioned across the width of the vehicle between the front and rear wheels and lies above a flat aluminum pan that forms the bottom of the SV's chassis. About two thirds of the SVs were manufactured with an air-assisted suspension system that actively controls ride height, including automatically lowering the vehicle at higher speeds.Two separate incidents in 2013 resulted in significant fires involving the SVs, one in Washington (Oct. 13) and one in Tennessee (Nov. 13). Both incidents involved active suspension equipped vehicles operating at highway speeds and reduced ride height running over debris in the roadway. In both incidents, the struck objects penetrated the aluminum pan at the forward area of the battery, damaging the lithium ion cells of the HVB. The SV's information display notified the driver of decreased battery performance and ultimately instructed the driver to stop the vehicle. The SVs were able to travel ~.8 and 1.8 miles after impact respectively. In both cases, smoke appeared shortly after the vehicle stopped and a fire developed in the HVB. Thermal runaway occurred in the HVB cells. The fires destroyed the vehicles but did not result in injuries.In the Tennessee incident, the object struck by the SV was determined to be a three-ball hitch that apparently fell from another vehicle. Tesla performed a series of tests reconstructing this incident and determined that a similar shaped object contacting the forward edge of the HVB could be tripped and potentially penetrate the HVB case. As the object's opposite end digs into the pavement, vehicle momentum causes the object to impart upward force into the case, described by Tesla as a piking effect. Tesla's testing reproduced damage similar to that seen in the Tennessee incident, and also showed that a change in ride height strategy, which was implemented in Nov. 2013 via a telematic software update to prevent the SVs lowering at legal roadway speeds, mitigates the risk of battery compartment penetration when a three-ball hitch is struck.The object struck in the Washington incident was not identified. More severe damage to the incident vehicle and the unknown shape of the object raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of raising the ride height for objects other than a three-ball hitch. In a Mar. 10, 2014 meeting with ODI, Tesla stated it would conduct a free-of-charge service campaign to modify the SVs by adding three new components to the vehicle's undercarriage to protect the HVB. A low-hanging transverse member and an additional underbody plate would be mounted forward of the HVB case and a third plate would overlap the leading edge of the case. Testing conducted by Tesla demonstrated that these modifications improved protection from debris impacts.ODI was aware of two fires stemming from road debris impacts when the investigation began. According to Tesla, the SV fleet had accumulated ~90M miles of service at the time it revised the ride height strategy. No further incidents have been identified, and Tesla reports the Model S fleet has traveled an additional ~90M miles. ODI believes impacts with road debris are normal and foreseeable. In this case, Tesla's revision of vehicle ride height and addition of increased underbody protection should reduce both the frequency of underbody strikes and the resultant fire risk. A defRead more